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Two Essays on Financial Condition of Firms

Sanjay Kudrimoti

ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes two related chapters that analyze financial condition of
firms. In the first chapter, I examine the relationship between the firms’ level of cash
holdings and governance. The findings show that higher levels of cash holdings are
significantly related to strong governance. The results also show that firms with strong
governance hold asymmetrically higher levels of cash than firms with weak governance
when they have high growth opportunities. Furthermore, I also test the impact of
financial constraint status of the firm on the level of cash holdings for both good and
poorly governed firms separately. The results suggest that strong governance firms hold
higher levels of cash to use as financial slack in order to avoid financial distress. In the
second essay I examine if a firm’s success in leaving distress is explained by firm
characteristics and manager decisions. I proxy the managers’ decisions by measuring
changes in operating, investing, and financing choice variables. Timely decisions with
regard to product refinement, proxied by increased investment in research and
development and reduction in capital expenditures, increase the probability of successful
turnaround. Further the results show that increased financing through additional sale of
equity, acquisitions and sale of assets do not help a firm exit financial distress.

v

Essay 1
Is the Level of Cash Holdings Influenced by Corporate Governance?
1.1

Introduction
Corporate liquidity enables firms to make investments when opportunities arise

without the need to access external capital markets (Keynes, 1936), thereby avoiding
transactions costs and the costs of information asymmetries often associated with equity
issuances. On the contrary, the agency argument against padding up cash states that
additional cash in the hands of managers will be misused (Jensen, 1986). Typically, the
intuitive notion is agency costs are real and it would be more valuable to put cash into use
making a positive return instead of keeping for manager discretion. Given this idea it is
surprising to see firms increasing their cash holdings as a percentage of total assets on
average in recent times (Ditmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). I examine cash holdings to
determine if it is driven by firm interest or manager interest. In other words, is the
increase in cash holdings a manifestation of agency costs or manager identification of a
new effective use of cash?
To determine if increased cash holdings are pro-firm or anti-firm I turn to firm
governance. All else equal, firms with better governance should act more in the interest
of shareholders than firms with poor governance. In the same vein, managers who are
less entrenched should act more in line with the interests of shareholders as compared to
firms with deeply entrenched managers. Given the ability of governance to force
1

managers to act in the best interests of shareholders, if firm governance is positively
related to cash holdings then the recent increase in cash holdings may be a positive
development. On the other hand, if firm governance is negatively related to cash holdings
then the trend of increased cash holdings may be a reflection of agency problems. In this
paper, I attempt to address the following questions. Do firms with strong or poor
governance hold more cash, and if so, why does governance influence cash holdings?
Managers who maximize shareholder wealth should set the firm’s cash holdings
at a level where the marginal benefit of cash holdings equals the marginal cost (Opler et
al., 1999). The potential benefits of holding more cash are found to be increased financial
slack and lower risk with higher liquidity. Financial slack and higher liquidity will allow
firms to take advantage of more opportunities (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and avoid
financial troubles. The costs of holding liquid assets are lower returns, higher taxation on
the interest, and perhaps the most dangerous is an increase in agency costs (Jensen
(1986); Stulz (1990)). Available funds provide managers the ability to invest in projects
providing pecuniary benefits, thus increasing agency costs. Increased agency costs have
been shown to affect firm performance adversely.
Given the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of holding cash, I find evidence
that the higher levels of cash holdings are not, on average, associated with higher agency
problems. The results illustrate increased cash holdings are positively related with
governance, as firms with strong governance hold significantly more cash as a percentage
of assets. I find this result to be robust to two different measures of firm governance,
Gompers, et al (2003) Governance (G-index) and the Bebchuck, et al. (2005)
Entrenchment index (E-index). I also find this difference to be robust after using
2

numerous controls to measure the differences between firms with strong and poor
governance, including documented performance differences by controlling for firm cash
flows. Firms with better governance are able to reduce the marginal cost of carrying cash,
thus increasing the value of cash. The results of this paper are consistent with the value of
cash when in the hands of strong (well governed) managers. Next, I turn my attention to
why do firms with strong governance hold more cash?
To explain the large difference in cash holdings between firms with strong versus
poor governance, I hypothesize that firms with strong governance will increase their cash
holdings when it makes sense to do so. Firms with strong governance will take advantage
of the benefits of holding cash such as increased financial slack during times of higher
growth opportunities and will increase cash when free of financial constraint. The results
are consistent with this idea as they show firms with strong governance hold higher levels
of cash when they have good investment opportunities. While the findings show that both
well and poorly governed firms hold larger percentages of cash when they have increased
growth opportunities, firms with strong governance hold asymmetrically higher amounts
than firms with poor governance. The results also demonstrate that firms with strong
governance do not significantly increase their cash holdings when they do not have
strong growth opportunities. Another potential reason for higher levels of cash holdings
by strong governance firms is to build up slack in order to avoid financial pitfalls
(Lamont, 1997), classified in this paper as financial constraint or distress. I find strong
governance firms invariably vary the level of cash holdings in times of financial
constraint while poor governance firms appear to use up cash and hold low levels of cash
holdings, whether they are financially constrained or not.
3

This paper adds to the current literature in two different areas. The first area looks
at the importance and value of cash to firms (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). I build
on the idea of Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999). They show that managers
maximize shareholder wealth by setting the firm’s cash holdings at a level such that the
marginal benefit of cash holdings equals the marginal cost of those holdings. I show firm
governance can mitigate agency issues and increase the value of cash holdings, thus
offering an explanation for the observed trend of higher cash holdings seen in recent
times. I also add to the literature emphasizing the importance of corporate governance
and agency issues in the workings of modern corporations. Prior research focuses on the
impact of governance mechanisms on (i) firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1991, Bhagat and Black, 2002 and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003), (ii) acquisition
activity (Byrd and Hickman, 1992), (iii) over investment of free-cash flow (Richardson,
2006), (iv) diversification discount (Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson, 2006) and (v) write-offs
(Minnick, 2004). I add to this literature by investigating how the quality of corporate
governance can influence a firm’s level of cash holdings. The results of this paper are
consistent with the work of Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003) and provide some potential
insight as to how firms with strong governance can lead to increases in stock returns.
I also add another side to the results of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). Their
study focuses on the value effects of governance on cash resources by analyzing how a
change in cash holdings leads to a change in the market valuation of a firm. They find a
positive and significant difference in the change in valuation of firm under the influence

4

of a strong governance policy. They also value the excess cash1 for poor and well
governed firms and find that well governed firms have double the value of cash as
compared to poorly governed firms. Based on these findings, they illustrate governance
as having a relatively minor impact on how firms accumulate cash, but a significant
impact on how firms spend their money.
Harford, et al. (2008) also study how agency problems affect cash holdings of
firms. Their study primarily comments on the behavior and policy issues observed for
poor governance firms with respect to the use of excess cash holdings. In analyzing the
differences in cash holdings of strong and poorly governed firms, they focus on the
investment behavior and pay out policies of their sample firms. Their results show that
firms with higher levels of excess cash and poor governance increase capital
expenditures, increase acquisition activity and disburse excess cash to shareholders as
share repurchases, thus exhibiting a less commitment behavior. Firms with excess cash
and good governance disburse cash to shareholders by initiating or increasing dividends.
While Harford et al. (2008) address how firms with poor governance end up with lower
levels of cash holdings, my paper attempts to address why firms with different
governance structures tend to hold different levels of cash holdings by analyzing the
impact of growth opportunities of firms. Consistent with Harford et al. (2008), my initial
results show that good governance firms with better growth opportunities hold higher
levels of cash holdings. I examine the role of growth opportunities further by separating
the sample into groups of high, average and low growth firms (Growth opportunities

1

Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith define excess cash as cash reserves held in excess of those needed for
operations and investments.
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proxied by Q). I run my tests on these three sub samples and find that only well governed
firms with high and average growth opportunities tend to hold higher levels of cash
holdings. Good governance firms with low Q values do not significantly hold higher cash
holdings. This analysis provides new evidence on the interaction of firm growth and
governance in influencing cash holdings. Another important distinction this paper has
from the Harford et al. paper is about the explanation of the role of financial constraints
for good and poor governance firms with respect to the cash holdings. After showing that
financially unconstrained firms hold higher levels of cash holdings on average, I further
explore the role of financial constraints and governance on firm’s cash holdings. The
results show that firm governance influences cash holdings only for financially
unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that financially unconstrained and well governed
firms hold higher level of cash holdings as compared to well governed and financially
constrained firms. Firms with poor governance hold lower cash holdings, whether they
are financially constrained or not. That is, this study identifies situations where strong
governance firms hold more cash and poses explanations for the significant difference
between the average cash holding of firms with strong versus weak governance.
The next section reviews the related literature and section III addresses the issues
with sample construction. Section IV comments on the observations made on summary
statistics, and discusses the results of the empirical tests and robustness tests and section
V concludes.

6

1.2

Related Literature
Managers and shareholders view the costs and benefits of liquid asset holdings

differently. Managers have greater preference for cash, because it reduces firm risk and
increases their discretion. Opler et al. (1999) state that “As long as there is any cost to
holding cash, a firm that simply accumulates cash will at some point have an excessive
amount of cash, and shareholders would be better off if the firm used that cash to pay
additional dividends or to repurchase shares.” Analysis of investment decisions of firms
occupies a prominent place in research programs in economics and corporate finance.
Starting with Modigliani and Miller (1958) a vast amount of finance literature focuses on
the pace and pattern of business investment in fixed capital. This paper belongs to the
subset of this literature that treats cash holdings as investment in cash asset. Asymmetric
information2 raises complications concerning the optimal choice of the financing method
and the appropriate discount rate to use in present value calculations when evaluating
investments. Investment expenditures in fixed capital and net working capital reduce
dependence on external financing in presence of higher levels of cash holdings by firms.
This analysis lends support for the argument that the level of cash holdings of a firm
helps determine both the future growth and its ability to sustain downturns.
1.2.1

Costly External Financing
An important insight, due to Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) and

Greenwald, and Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), is that raising equity externally will generally
be problematic due to an adverse-selection problem of the sort first identified by Akerlof
2

Asymmetric information problems in capital markets: Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984), Myers and
Majluf (1984), Myers (1984), et al.
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(1970). Of course, an inability to access new equity would not compromise investment if
firms could frictionlessly raise unlimited amounts of debt financing. However, a variety
of theories suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1983) and
others, show that the same adverse-selection problem can lead to credit rationing,
whereby firms are simply unable to obtain all the debt financing they would like at the
prevailing market interest rate. Myers (1977), examines the impact of conflicts between
firms’ claimholders on their investment decisions leading to debt ‘overhang’ and hence
underinvestment. Thus, cash reserves provide benefits to equity holders by reducing the
underinvestment problem. Managers wishing to avoid the costs associated with external
financing in an imperfect information environment find it optimal to maintain sufficient
internal financial flexibility to allow them to reduce the underinvestment problem.
Further, since the equity holders suffer the loss from underinvestment, they find it value
increasing for managers to maintain the buffer stock of cash.
1.2.2

Costs and Benefits of Liquid Asset Holdings
Chudson (1945) suggests that cash-to-assets ratios tend to vary systematically by

industry, and tend to be higher among profitable companies. Vogel and Maddala (1967)
show that cash balances declined over the time frame they examined, especially for larger
firms. The more recent research papers have focused on the corporate actions resulting
from high liquid asset holdings. Baskin (1987) highlights that firms use cash holdings for
competitive purposes and Harford (1999) shows that cash-rich firms are more likely to
make acquisitions. Opler et al (1999) analyze the benefits of liquid assets holdings under
two different motivations. (i) Transaction cost motive – a firm saves transaction costs to
raise funds and does not have to liquidate assets to make payments, and (ii) Precautionary
8

motive – firm can use the liquid assets to finance its activities and investments if other
sources of funding are not available or are excessively costly. Recent literature has
focused on the relation between cash holdings and its impact on the value of firm.
Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue that the value of one additional dollar of cash
reserves varies with its intended use. They analyze three specific uses: (1) paying back to
shareholders in the form of dividends, (2) capital spending and (3) repaying debt or other
obligations. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) explore this issue further by asking “How
does corporate governance impact the value of the firm and eventual use of cash
reserves?” They document value destruction and performance declines of poorly
governed, cash rich firms. Similarly Harford et al (2008) analyze how agency problems
affect the propensity to stockpile cash in the US. They primarily find that poorly
governed firms dissipate cash more quickly either by increasing investments, acquisition
activity or exercising a payout policy of stock repurchases. My paper results concur with
earlier literature and additionally I focus on the motivation issues behind the reasons for
higher cash holdings by good governance firms. This paper adds to this line of literature,
by extending the discussion to include arguments for explaining the circumstances as to
when it is appropriate for good governance firms to hold higher level of cash holdings
1.2.3

Investments and Financing Constraints
A common way of examining the impact of financial constraints in firms’

investment choices empirically was pioneered by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
Using a-priori criterion that relates to the gap between the costs of external financing and
available internal funds, firms are categorized into classes of more- or less financially
constrained. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) estimate the investment-cash flow
9

sensitivities of Japanese companies and find that firms, which are associated with
keiretsu3 groups, have significantly lower sensitivities. Whited (1992) uses a financial
constraint premise in that small firms with low liquid asset positions have limited access
to debt markets, because they lack collateral necessary to back up their borrowing. Her
study finds the exogenous finance constraint to be particularly binding for the constrained
group of firms. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) find that firms with access to
commercial paper and bond markets plan their investments independent of firm’s cash
flows for the period. However, for firms with only limited access to capital markets (as
indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets), investment in the firm tends to
be ‘excessively’ sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow. Lamont (1997) shows that firms
faced with a cash flow shock in their core business reduce investment in core and noncore segments. These and other studies found that the association between investment
and cash flow is higher for firms that are expected to be more financially constrained
according to various a-priori criteria.
The consensus regarding the positive relation between the degree of financial
constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity was disturbed by the influential work of
Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They show that the theoretical relation between the degree
of financial constraints and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow does not have to be
uniformly positive. Kaplan and Zingales support their argument empirically by applying
subjective criteria to identify financially constrained and unconstrained firms, and
demonstrating that firms that are less financially constrained exhibit significantly higher
investment-cash flow sensitivities than those that appear more constrained. Their findings
3

Keiretsu institution coordinates the activities of member firms and finances much of their investment
activity
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are supported by Cleary (1999), who uses large samples of U.S. and international firms,
and reports results that are consistent with Kaplan and Zingales’ findings.
1.2.4

Corporate Governance Impacting Corporate Finance
Richardson (2006) examines whether firms’ governance structures are associated

with over-investment of free cash flow. Prior literature argues that agency conflicts arise
when firms have free cash flow (e.g., Jensen, 1986, 1993 and Stulz, 1990). Richardson
finds little systematic evidence that governance structures are determined in response to
the severity of these agency costs; however, he finds evidence that governance structures
mitigate over-investment. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) retrace the shift in
governance structure by analyzing the takeover market since the advent of junk bonds in
1980s. They argue that the rise of junk bond market enabled hostile-takeover offers for
even the largest of public firms, in response to which many firms added takeover
defenses and other restrictions of shareholder rights. They also note that during the same
time period, many states passed antitakeover laws giving firms further defenses against
hostile bids. They combine a large set of governance provisions into an index which
proxies for the strength of shareholder rights, and then study the empirical relationship
between this index and corporate performance. They find that firms with stronger
shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower
capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
Jiraporn, Kim and Davidson (2006) explore the agency theory as an explanation
for the diversification discount. They empirically examine the potential connections
between corporate governance, shareholder rights, firm value, and the propensity for a
firm to be diversified. The governance index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
11

(2003) is employed as the measure of strength of shareholder rights. Their empirical
studies reveal that firms in which shareholder rights are more suppressed by restrictive
corporate governance suffer a deeper diversification discount.
1.3

Sample Construction
Before addressing the core issues related to data, I first detail information

regarding the construction of the index used for governance measures. Next I provide
information regarding the construction of the KZ index used for distinguishing firms as
financially constrained and unconstrained, followed by the information regarding
construction of Ohlson’s O score used to identify probability of distress for firms.
1.3.1

Measure of Governance Characteristics
To measure the strength of shareholder rights, the database I use employs the G-

Index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, (2003), henceforth GIM and the EIndex developed by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005), henceforth BCF. They both use
data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which publishes detailed
listings of corporate governance provisions for individual firms in Corporate Takeover
Defenses, by Virginia Rosenbaum. The data on governance provisions are derived from
various sources, such as corporate bylaws, charters, proxy statements, annual reports, as
well as 10-K and 10-Q documents filed with SEC.
The governance Index is constructed as follows: for every firm GIM add one
point for every provision that restricts shareholder rights (increase managerial power).
While this index does not accurately reflect the relative impacts of the various provisions,
it has the advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible. The index does not
require any judgments about the efficacy or wealth effects of any of these provisions;
12

GIM consider only the impact on the balance of power. To clarify the logic behind the
construction on the Governance Index, GIM use the following example; consider
classified boards, a provision that staggers the terms and elections of directors and, thus,
can be employed to slow down a hostile takeover. If management uses this power
judiciously, it could possibly lead to an increase in overall shareholder wealth; if
management, however, uses this power to maintain private benefits of control, then this
provision would diminish shareholder wealth. Either way, it is apparent that classified
boards enhance the power of managers and weaken the control rights of large
shareholders. Hence, the Governance Index captures the balance of power between
management and shareholder.
Most provisions other than classified boards can be viewed with the same logic.
Almost every provision enables management to resist different types of shareholder
activism, such as calling special meetings, changing the firm’s charter or bylaws, suing
the directors, or replacing them all at once. GIM note, however, that there are two
exceptions, secret ballots (confidential voting) and cumulative voting. A secret ballot
designates a third party to count proxy votes and, therefore, prevents management from
observing how specific shareholders vote. Cumulative voting enables shareholders to
concentrate their director’s votes so that a large minority shareholder can ensure some
board representation. These two provisions are usually proposed by shareholders and
opposed by management because they enhance shareholder rights and diminish the power
of management. Thus, for each one, GIM add one point to the Governance Index when
firms do not have it. For all other provisions, GIM add one point when firms do have it.
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In summary, the Governance Index is simply the sum of one point for the presence (or
absence) of each provision.
BCF (2005) argue that there is no a priori reason to expect that all the 24 IRRC
provisions have equal relevance when measuring firm’s governance. They study which
IRRC provisions matter to the relationship between corporate governance and firm value.
Their analysis leads them to identify six provisions that are likely to play a substantial
role in determining the governance of firms. Based on these six provisions they construct
an index that they label the ‘entrenchment index”. Each firm in their database is given a
score, from zero to six, with higher the score indicating deeper entrenchment by the
managers and hence proxied for poorer governance.
1.3.2

Measure for Financial Constraints
In order to study the impact of financial status (constraint / unconstraint), I divide

the sample into sub samples that face greater financing constraints than others as defined
by the existing literature. The approach I use to distinguish the sample as financially
constrained and unconstrained is based on the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
study. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms into discrete categories of financial
constraint and then use an ordered logit regression to relate their classifications to
accounting variables. Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) used these regression
coefficients to construct an index consisting of a linear combination of five accounting
ratios, called the KZ index. The KZ index is higher for firms that are more constrained.
The five variables, along with the signs of their coefficients in the KZ index, are: cash
flow to total capital (negative), the market to book ratio (positive), debt to total capital
(positive), dividends to total capital (negative), and cash holdings to capital (negative).
14

Following Lamont, Polk and Saa-Raquejo (2001), I construct the five variable KZ index
for each firm-year as the following linear combination:
KZ Index (five variable) =

-1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.130*Leverage –
39.368*Dividends – 1.315*CashHoldings.

I classify the top tercile of all firms in the total sample ranked on the KZ index as
financially constrained and classify the bottom tercile as financially unconstrained. This
classification results in 6,153 firm-years as financially constrained and 5,509 firm-years
as financially unconstrained.
1.3.3

Measure for Financial Distress
Ohlson (1980) uses maximum likelihood estimation of the so-called conditional

logit model to predict corporate failure as evidenced by the event of bankruptcy. They
identify four basic factors as being statistically significant in affecting the probability of
failure within one year – (i) size; (ii) measures of financial structure; (iii) measures of
performance and (iv) measures of current liquidity. In this paper I use Ohlson’s
probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure very closely following Bhagat, Moyen
and Suh (2005)’s use of the same measure to identify firms in performance declines. This
measure is based on Ohlson’s predicted bankruptcy probabilities p, where P = 1/(1+e-Yit)
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln (TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA –
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN
Wherein TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities
15

ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of current period with
previous period over the absolute value of the difference (NIt – NIt-1)/ (|NIt| - |NIt-1|).
Following Bhagat et al (2005) this measure is obtained from a variant of Ohlson’s
bankruptcy probability model. Because the FUTL variable greatly restricts the sample
size, pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities ˜p are calculated by ignoring the effect of FUTL in
predicting bankruptcy probabilities: ˜p = 1/ (1 + e-Yit)
Firms with declining performance and facing financial distress include firm-year
observations with pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities greater than or equal to 50%.
1.3.4

The Sample Selection Process
I use the G-index developed by Gompers et al (2003) and E-index developed by

Bebchuck et al. (2005) as my measures of governance in order to distinguish between
strong and poorly governed firms. Due to this fact the sample size for this paper is
constrained by the firm-years for which the G-Index and the E-Index numbers that have
been computed and provided for research purposes on the respective authors’ homepages.
The accounting data for the sample comes from the Research Insight – COMPUSTAT
database (numbers in parentheses are COMPUSTAT data items). I include firms for all
the years of the sample period (1990-2005) for which t-1 and t-2 COMPUSTAT data is
available for the said parameters detailed in Table 1. The final sample size is 17,587 firmyears.

16

Table 1. Variable Definition and Construction
S.No

Variable
Notation

Variable Description

COMPUSTAT
Notation

1.
2.

Size
Cash Flow

Natural logarithm of total assets
Income before Extraordinary Items + Depreciation and Amortization

Ln(#6)
#18 + #14

3.

Q

Market value of assets / Book Value of assets

{(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60
+ #74)} / #6

4.

Leverage

Total Liabilities / Total Assets

#181 / #6

5.

KZ

-1.002*CashFlow+0.283*Q+3.130*Leverage– 39.368*Dividends –
1.315*CashHoldings

Item #8 is a lagged variable.

CashFlow
Q

(#18 + #14) / #8
{(#6 + (#25 * #24) – #60 –
#74)} / #6

Leverage

(#9 + #34) / (#9 + #34 +
#216)

Dividends

(#21 + #19) / #8]

CashHoldings

#1 / #8

6.

O-Score

Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA +
.757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA – 1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO –
1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN

Ln(TA)
TLTA
WCTA

Ln(#6)
#181/#6
(#4 - #5) / #6

CLCA

#5/#4

NITA
FUTL
INTWO

#172/#6
#110/#181
1 if #172t & #172t-1
< 0; 0 otherwise.
1 if #181 > #6; 0
otherwise.
(NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| |NIt-1|)

OENEG
CHIN

7.

Cash Holdings

{Cash + Mkt Sec}/ {T.A}

[#1 / {#6}]

8.

Net Assets

Book value of Total assets - Cash & Mkt Sec.

#6 - #1

9.

P/O Ratio

Common and preferred dividends / Net Income

(#19 + #21) / #172

10.

NWC

{Current assets – Cash & Mkt Sec – Current Liabilities}

{#4 - #1 - #5}

11

Acq

Acquisitions

#129

12.
13.
14.

CAPEX
G-index
E-Index

Capital Expenditures
The Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index
The Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) Entrenchment Index

#128

15.

Strong Gov

Firms for which the G number is less than or equal to 7 or E number
is less than or equal to 2

16.

Bad Gov

Firms for which the G number is greater than or equal to 12 or E
number is greater than or equal to 4

This table briefly describes the construction of the control and test variables used in this
paper.
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For a firm to be included in the sample in a given year t, it must meet the
following criteria. (a) It has at least two years of COMPUSTAT data prior to year t for all
the variables listed in Table 1 and (b) it has to have a governance index (G) score as
tabulated by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and entrenchment index (E) as tabulated
by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005). The G index score have numbers from 0 to 24,
with the higher the score indicating poor governance. In the construction of the E index
only a subset of IRRC provisions are used and the index goes from 0 to 6, again with a
higher index score indicating poor governance. I have made one critical assumption with
respect to the governance index and the entrenchment index numbers for the firms in my
sample. Both databases provide index numbers for discrete years such as 1990, 1993, et
al. It is widely accepted in the governance literature that governance characteristics for
firms do not change significantly, if at all, from year to year.
Hence, in order to complete my panel data I make an assumption that G and E
scores respectively for all firms in the years not tabulated by GIM (2003) and BCF(2005)
have the same G score and E score respectively as that of the previously reported year
until new data is available. For example, Amgen Inc., (TIC: AMGN) has a G score 9 in
year 1993 and 10 in year 1995 as per the GIM (2003) tabulations. Based on my
assumptions, I tabulate for AMGN a G score of 9 for 1994 and a score of 10 for year
1996 and 1997. Following this assumption I fill up the G and E scores for the years 1991,
1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003. I then classify the firms with a G score4

4

Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) refer to the portfolio of firms with G <= 5 as a “democracy” portfolio
and a portfolio of firms with G >= 14 as a “dictatorship” portfolio. Harford et al. (2008) sort the GIndex
into quartiles and term the 1st quartile (strong shareholder rights) as firms' with good governance and the
4th (weak shareholder rights) quartiles as firms with poor governance.

18

of 7 and less as firms with strong governance and firms with G score of 12 and greater as
poor governance firms.
1.3.5

Variable Description
Table 1 lists all the variables used in this paper. I use the market-to-book ratio as

measure of a firm’s growth opportunities, since the value of growth options are not
included in a firm’s book value, but should be reflected in its market value. I define the
firm’s cash flow as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization
charges. A firm’s decision with regard to its holdings of cash is modeled as a function of
a number of sources and (competing) uses of funds (Almeida et al. 2004). Fazzari and
Petersen (1993) argue that firms can offset the impact of cash flow shocks on fixed
investment by adjusting working capital. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999)
find that capital expenditures increase monotonically with excess cash. Harford (1999)
finds that cash-rich firms tend increase its acquisition activity. I include net working
capital, which I define as current assets, minus cash and marketable securities, minus
current liabilities. The control variables net working capital, capital expenditure,
acquisition, and cash flow are scaled by net assets, which is the book value of total assets
net of cash. The Governance variables have been borrowed from the Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2003) Governance Index and Bebchuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005)
Entrenchment Index. Table 1 list each of these variables and very briefly mentions its
construction methodology.
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1.4

Empirical Results

1.4.1

Summary Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the different variables used in the paper.

The average cash holdings over the 15-year sample period used is about 0.12. In other
words, firms hold just under 12 percentage points of their total assets in cash. The next
two variables examine the governance of firms. First, the G-index developed by
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is constructed as a proxy for the balance of power
between shareholders and managers. The average G-index score for the sample is just
over nine. The E-index developed by Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) as another
governance measure, examines the entrenchment level of managers. The average E-index
score for the sample is around 2.27.
The two variables, the KZ-index and the probability of distress, focus on
measuring the level of financial constraint for firms. The average KZ-index5 is about -3.9.
The distress variables focus on firms taking financial constraint one step further. The
measure for firm level of distress is the probability of bankruptcy (distress) as measured
by the Ohlson (1980). The average is 0.31 for this measure.
The final seven variables are control variables used in the regressions including
size, cash flow, leverage, Q, net working capital, capital expenditure, and acquisitions.
Table 2 shows the averages of each of these variables. Table 2 also breaks down the
sample based on strong and poor governance. Separating the types of governance
illustrates the major difference in cash holdings between strong and poor governance,
which is around 7.5 percentage points.
5

The KZ index is constructed by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) using results from Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) measures of firm level of financial constraints.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Full Sample
Variable
Cash Holdings
G-index

Obs.
17587
17587

Mean
0.1187
9.0545

Std.
Dev.
0.1646
2.7601

Strong
Gov

Poor
Gov

Mean
0.1471
5.8420

Mean
0.0728
13.0109

Difference

Good-Bad
0.0743***
-7.169***
E-index
17587
2.2746 1.3447
1.0306
3.6213 2.5908***
KZ Index
17587
-3.8991 17.8584
-5.1551
-2.5422 2.6129***
Prob. of Distress
17587
0.3137 0.2863
0.2980
0.3112 0.0133***
Size
17587
7.1672 1.5020
6.8232
7.5417 0.7185***
Cashflow
17587
0.2227 0.6666
0.3009
0.0998 0.2011***
Leverage
17587
0.5677 0.3322
0.5371
0.5980 0.0608***
Q
17587
1.8357 1.4371
1.9911
1.6725 0.3186***
NWC
17587
0.0664 0.3042
0.0707
0.0868 -0.0161
CAPX
17587
0.0685 0.0597
0.0731
0.0622 0.0110***
ACQ
17587
0.0247 0.0636
0.0238
0.0264 -0.0027
This table provides summary statistics on key variables of the sample of 17,587 firm-year
observations (1990-2005). Cash Holdings is computed as cash and marketable securities
standardized by total assets. G-index and E-index are the governance and entrenchment
index numbers as tabulated by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuck et al. (2005)
respectively. KZ index, a proxy for financial constraint, is measured following the
methodology employed by Lamont et al (2001). Probability of distress is measured
following Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology. Size is
measured as natural log of total assets. Cashflow is measured as income before
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization. Leverage is ratio of total
liabilities to total assets. Q is measured as ratio of market value to book value of assets.
Net working capital is measured as current assets less of cash and marketable securities
and current liabilities. Variables Cashflow, Net working capital, Capital expenditures and
Acquisitions all are standardized by net assets (Total assets minus cash and marketable
securities) following Opler et al. (1999). The construction of all variables is detailed in
Table 1.
This table also illustrates differences between both strong and poor governance firms,
especially in terms of performance as measured by cash flow. A higher number for KZ
index indicates financially constrained. Table 2 shows that on average poorly governed
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firms are more financially constrained. Poorly governed firms on average have higher
leverage and lower growth opportunities and hence lower capital expenditures as
compared to strong governance firms. Further, it can be observed that both investment in
net working capital and acquisitions are higher for poorly governed firms, although the
differences for these two parameters are not statistically significant.
1.4.2

Univariate Tests
Table 3 breaks down the cash holdings by year and by governance quality. Using

the G-index, governance is split up into good, average, and poor governance. Column ‘N’
notes the firm count under each category. Consistent with prior evidence such as Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007)6, this table shows cash holdings are increasing over time. During
the sample time period, cash holdings increase from about 8.6 percent of total assets to
just over 20 percent of total assets. Firms with strong governance experience an increase
in cash holdings of about 14 percentage points over the time period, while firms with
poor governance experience only about an 8 percentage point increase. The difference in
cash holdings between strong and bad governance firms increases over the sample period
and peaks in 2002 and 2003. This evidence would not provide support for the classic
agency argument predicting higher cash holdings for poor governance firms.

6

The sample considered in their paper reflects variation in cash holdings as percentage of total assets from
5% in year 1990 to 13% in 2003.

22

Table 3. Sample Sort: Cash Holdings by Governance Over Time (Using G-Index)
Diff.
(Good
Gov Year
CH
N
CH
N
CH
N
CH
N
Poor Gov)
1990 0.1031 339 0.0834 498
0.0633
159 0.0861 997
0.0398
1991 0.1026 343 0.0848 505
0.0639
181 0.0865 1030
0.0387
1992 0.1051 326 0.0838 484
0.0625
168 0.0866 979
0.0426
1993 0.1190 318 0.0961 551
0.0768
224 0.0985 1094
0.0421
1994 0.1186 306 0.0852 532
0.0646
218 0.0905 1057
0.0540
1995 0.1147 301 0.0842 551
0.0600
253 0.0869 1106
0.0548
1996 0.1149 289 0.0885 531
0.0639
242 0.0899 1063
0.0510
1997 0.1215 271 0.0852 494
0.0626
218 0.0900 983
0.0588
1998 0.1490 349 0.0950 603
0.0636
259 0.1091 1210
0.0854
1999 0.1489 316 0.0946 576
0.0591
265 0.1076 1157
0.0898
2000 0.1416 401 0.1103 567
0.0615
302 0.1110 1271
0.0801
2001 0.1587 412 0.1246 554
0.0732
326 0.1260 1291
0.0855
2002 0.2225 382 0.1771 534
0.0865
285 0.1748 1202
0.1360
2003 0.2298 365 0.1809 684
0.0979
293 0.1801 1342
0.1319
2004 0.1957 350 0.1894 757
0.1114
290 0.1778 1396
0.0843
2005 0.2397 103 0.2064 229
0.1417
77 0.2017 409
0.0980
Total 0.1471 5173 0.1195 9262 0.0728 3762 0.1187 17587
0.0743
This table breaks down the cash holdings by year over the sample period 1990-2005 as
shown under the column Total. Further, the cash holdings are also tabulated separately
for good, average and poor governed firms by each year. The governance measure
considered here is the Gompers et al (2003) G-Index measure. Firms with G-score of 7
and below are termed as Good governance firms. Firms with G-score 12 and higher are
categorized as poorly governed firms. Finally, all the firm with a G-score between 8 and
11 are termed as firms with average governance.
Good Gov

Avg. Gov

Poor Gov

Total

Table 4 provides a correlation matrix for all variables to be used in the
regressions. I find that the correlation coefficient between most of the variables is fairly
low. We do see as expected a high correlation between the G-index and the E-index.

23

Table 4. Correlation Matrix

CH
Gindex
eindex

Size
KZ
Leverage
Q
CAPX
ACQ
Cashflow
NWC

CH
1.0000
-0.0721
(0.0000)
-0.0047

Gindex

Eindex

0.7934

1.0000

(0.5187)
-0.4370
(0.0000
-0.1813
(0.0000
-0.3495
(0.0000)
0.5184
(0.0000)
0.0730
(0.0000)
-0.1315
(0.0000)
0.8794
(0.0000)
-0.3704
(0.0000)

(0.0000)
0.2653
(0.0000)
0.0022
(0.7750)
0.0674
(0.0000)
-0.0926
(0.0000)
-0.0088
(0.2298)
0.0319
(0.0000)
-0.0326
(0.0000)
-0.0556
(0.0000)

0.0316
(0.0000)
0.0253
(0.0009)
0.0178
(0.0154)
-0.0692
(0.0000)
-0.0487
(0.0000)
0.0716
(0.0000)
-0.0367
(0.0000)
-0.0407
(0.0000)

Size

KZ

Leverage

Q

CAPX

ACQ

Cashflow

NWC

1.0000

1.0000
0.1110
(0.0000)
0.2834
(0.0000)
-0.3030
(0.0000)
-0.0768
(0.0000)
-0.0983
(0.0000)
-0.3465
(0.0000)
-0.0141
(0.0546)

1.0000
0.1780
(0.0000)
-0.0615
(0.0000)
0.1012
(0.0000)
-0.3210
(0.0000)
-0.1050
(0.0000)
0.0200
(0.0083)

1.0000
-0.2408
(0.0000)
-0.0174
(0.0175)
0.0532
(0.0000)
-0.2329
(0.0000)
-0.2539
(0.0000)

1.0000
0.1099
(0.0000)
-0.0568
(0.0000)
0.3105
(0.0000)
-0.1361
(0.0000)

1.0000
-0.2050
(0.0000)
0.0498
(0.0000)
-0.0919
(0.0000)

1.0000
-0.1125
(0.0000)
0.0117
(0.1138)

1.0000
0.4389
(0.0000)

1.0000

This table shows the correlation matrix between the independent variables used in this paper. G-index and E-index are the governance
and entrenchment index numbers as tabulated by Gompers et al (2003) and Bebchuck et al. (2005) respectively. Size is measured as
natural log of total assets. KZ index, a proxy for financial constraint, is measured following the methodology employed by Lamont et
al (2001). Construction of variables: Cashflow, Q, Leverage, CAPX, ACQ and NWC are detailed in Table 1. P-values in parentheses.
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This is expected as these two measures are created from the same IRRC provisions,
where the E-index is a subset of the G-index focused on entrenchment provisions. These
two variables are not used in the same regression in the paper. The two are used only
independently to show the results are robust to either measurement of governance. In
order to make certain that multicollinearity is not an issue between independent variables,
Variance inflation factor (VIF) test was performed. VIF measures the impact of
collinearity among the independent variables’ in a regression model on the precision of
estimation. It expresses the degree to which collinearity among the predictors degrades
the precision of an estimate. Typically a VIF value greater than 10 is of concern. VIF
tests resulted with a maximum VIF measure 2.64 for leverage and the over-all mean VIF
was 1.42.
Table 5 runs a univariate sort on the sample. Panel A lists the cash holdings over
the sample period for all differing levels of governance. There is an obvious trend for
both G-index and E-index where cash holdings decrease as the G-index and E-index
increase. Increases in the G-index and E-index signify a worsening in firm governance.
Consistent with the findings of Table 3, firms with better governance hold more cash.
Panel B of Table 5 sorts cash holdings by additional variables. Also shown in the table is
a t-test of the difference between the high and low group of each different sort. The first
sort looks at G-index, which is a recap of table 3 and tests the difference between strong
and bad governance. The difference is almost 7.5 percentage points and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. E-index has a similar result to G-index.
Splitting the sample based on size shows smaller firms hold a higher percentage
of cash than larger firms. Small firms hold almost 11 percentage points more cash as
25

compared to assets as large firms do. The next factor examined is the financial constraint
level of firms, as measured by the KZ-index.
Table 5A: Univariate Test (Cash Holdings vs. Governance Measures)
Panel A: Cash Holdings
G-Index
Mean
2
Best Governance 0.2326
3
0.1615
4
0.1484

E-index
0
1
2

5
6
7

0.1466
0.1466
0.1568

3
4
5

8

0.1493

6

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Average
Governance

Best Governance

Average
Governance

Worst
Governance

Mean
0.1435
0.1554
0.1329
0.1113
0.0808
0.0582
0.0997

0.1283
0.1163
0.0941
0.0868
0.0640
0.0642
0.0628
0.0549
0.1076
0.0743

Worst
19
Governance
0.0530
Panel A shows cash holdings based on different levels of governance. G-Index is the
Gompers et al (2003) score and E-Index is the Bebchuck et al (2005) score. In both cases
the lower the index number, the better the governance of firms. The means reported here
are the mean values of cash holdings for firms with respective G and E index numbers.
Cash holdings are computed as cash and marketable securities standardized by total
assets.
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Table 5B: Univariate Test (Cash Holdings vs. Test Variables)
Panel B: Cash Holdings
Difference
(1-3)

Variable
Description
Mean
G-Index 1
Strong Governance
0.1471
G-Index 2
Average Governance
0.1195
G-Index 3
Poor Governance
0.0728
0.0743***
E-Index 1
Strong Governance
0.1511
E-Index 2
Average Governance
0.1220
E-Index 3
Poor Governance
0.0773
0.0738***
Size 1
Small
0.1818
Size 2
Medium
0.1095
Size 3
Large
0.0742
0.1076***
KZ-Index 1
Not Constrained
0.2176
KZ-Index 2
Average Constrained
0.0979
KZ-Index 3
Constrained
0.0530
0.1646***
Distress
Dummy: 0
Not Distress
0.1301
Distress
Dummy: 1
Distress
0.0948
0.0353***
Q1
Low Q
0.0790
Q2
Average Q
0.0933
Q3
High Q
0.2042
-0.1252***
Panel B shows cash holdings based on different levels of governance measures, Size,
Financial Constraint and Distress status and Growth Opportunities. G-Index and the EIndex broadly grouped as good, average and poor governance firms respectively. The
next sets of variables are grouped by size. Size as measured by total assets (adjusted for
CPI index for 2004 dollars) are sorted and grouped as size 1 (bottom tercile), size 3 (top
tercile) with size 2 constituting the middle tercile. KZ index scores, computed in
accordance with Lamont et al (2001) methodology, are also grouped by terciles, the
smallest of the three labeled as financially unconstrained firms. Probability of distress is
measured following Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology.
Distress dummy is 1 when Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy is greater than 0.5. Q
variable is computed as the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of firm and
proxy growth opportunities. Q values with less than 1 are firms with low growth
opportunities, Q values between 1 and 2 as firms with average growth opportunities and
Q values greater than 2 are firms with greatest growth opportunities. Cash holdings are
computed as cash and marketable securities standardized by total assets. The last column
shows difference of means t-test.
*** indicates significant at 1% confidence level
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Financially constrained firms hold over 16 percentage points less cash than nonfinancially constrained firms. Financially constrained firms find it difficult to access
financial markets (Whited, 1992; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995) and thus are forced to
put all of their assets to use and are unable to hold excess levels of cash. Firms considered
in financial distress have a similar issue with shortage of cash. Investment opportunities
as measured by Q also impact the level of cash holdings7. Firms with a higher Q or high
growth opportunities hold around 12.5 percentage points more cash as compared to assets
than firms with low growth opportunities. This is not surprising as firms with more future
growth opportunities will hold more cash on hand to quickly and more efficiently take
advantage of opportunities as they become available.
Table 6 examines the industry concentration of the firms in the sample. We
examine different industries to see if the difference in cash holdings between firms with
strong and poor governance is concentrated in certain industries. I report in Panel A as
any industry with at least 250 firm-year observations.
Table 6 is sorted by the total concentration of the sample by industry. Reported in the
table are cash holdings for each type of governance as well as the ratio of cash holdings
of strong governance firms to poor governance firms. I find certain industries have
greater differences, but only three industries of the reported 20 industries have ratios less
than one. That is, only 15 percent of the industries with significant concentrations do not
follow the trend of strong governance firms holding more cash.

7

The Q variable is used as a measure of the firm’s future growth opportunities in this paper. However, Q
is also sometimes employed as a performance measure. Thus, to avoid problems with interpretation of Q,
we also use an alternative measure of growth opportunities in a later section.
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Table 6A: Cash Holdings by Industry and Governance
Full Sample
SIC
Code
49

Good Gov

Bad Gov

Good/Bad

Industry
Electric, Gas and
Sanitary Services

Con
9.10%

CH
0.0217

Con
7.01%

CH
0.0178

Con
7.68%

CH
0.0198

Ratio
0.8993

Chemicals and Allied
Products
Business Services

8.10%

0.1707

7.63%

0.2108

9.88%

0.0993

2.1222

7.51%

0.2678

9.93%

0.2828

3.26%

0.1160

2.4387

Electrical and Electronic
Equipment (Ex.
Computers)
Industry and
Commercial Machinery
and Computers
Measuring and
Analyzing Instruments

7.36%

0.2153

9.08%

0.2531

4.97%

0.1431

1.7686

7.14%

0.1756

7.54%

0.2203

8.03%

0.0768

2.8669

4.86%

0.1583

3.37%

0.1873

5.97%

0.1174

1.5955

3.16%

0.0761

1.97%

0.0812

3.39%

0.0795

1.0211

3.15%

0.0570

3.83%

0.0749

2.61%

0.0416

1.7977

48

Transportation
Equipment
Food and Kindred
Products
Communication

2.94%

0.0736

3.81%

0.0952

3.39%

0.0156

6.1050

13

Oil & Gas Extraction

2.78%

0.0525

2.13%

0.0747

2.04%

0.0349

2.1424

33

Primary Metal Industries

2.59%

0.0493

2.37%

0.0483

4.13%

0.0436

1.1074

50

Wholesale Trade Durable Goods

2.54%

0.0582

2.46%

0.0467

2.88%

0.0542

0.8623

27

Printing, Publishing &
Allied Industries

2.48%

0.0813

1.88%

0.1150

3.37%

0.0359

3.2000

26

2.08%

0.0262

1.14%

0.0268

2.74%

0.0225

1.1907

2.05%

0.0536

1.25%

0.0825

2.88%

0.0440

1.8737

60

Paper and Allied
Products
Fabricated Metal
Products
Depository Institutions

2.03%

0.1158

2.04%

0.1407

1.82%

0.0868

1.6206

59

Miscellaneous Retail

1.77%

0.0951

3.09%

0.0954

0.62%

0.0487

1.9601

51

Wholesale Trade – Non
Durable Goods
Apparel and Accessory
Stores
Eating and Drinking
Places

1.52%

0.0594

0.60%

0.1223

2.85%

0.0328

3.7299

1.49%

0.1745

1.93%

0.1537

2.31%

0.1371

1.1212

1.42%

0.0499

1.39%

0.0533

1.57%

0.0564

0.9465

28
73
36

35

38
37
20

34

56
58

This table presents cash holdings (standardized by total assets) for firms differentiated by
industry. Only firms with at least 250 firm-year observations per industry are reported
here. The column Con represents concentration of firms by industry for the total sample.
Next, I report cash holdings for good governance firms and poor governance firms again
segregated by industry. The governance measure used here to is the Gomper, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003) G-Index. Similar results were obtained when Bebchuck, Cohen and
Ferrell (2005) E-Index was used. The last column reports the ratio of cash holdings for
good over poor governance firms.
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Table 6B. Cash Holdings by Industry and Growth Opportunities

SIC Code Industry
50
Wholesale Trade - Durable goods
49
58
37
33
56
26
38

Con
Mean-Q
2.54% 1.393

Good/Bad
Ratio
0.862

Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services 9.10% 1.107
0.899
Eating and Drinking Places
1.42% 1.990
0.947
Transportation Equipment
3.16% 1.531
1.021
Primary Metal Industries
2.59% 1.290
1.107
Apparel and Accessory Stores
1.49% 2.043
1.121
Paper and Allied Products
2.08% 1.465
1.191
Measuring and Analyzing
4.86% 2.219
1.596
Instruments
60
Depository Institutions
2.03% 1.219
1.621
36
Electrical and Electronic Equipment 7.36% 2.129
1.769
(Ex. Computers)
20
Food and Kindred Products
3.15% 2.058
1.798
34
Fabricated Metal Products
2.05% 1.512
1.874
59
Miscellaneous Retail
1.77% 2.015
1.960
28
Chemicals and Allied Products
8.10% 2.567
2.122
13
Oil & Gas Extraction
2.78% 1.505
2.142
73
Business Services
7.51% 2.514
2.439
35
Industry and Commercial Machinery 7.14% 1.890
2.867
and Computers
27
Printing, Publishing & Allied
2.48% 1.829
3.200
Industries
51
Wholesale Trade – Non Durable
1.52% 1.511
3.730
goods
48
Communication
2.94% 1.760
6.105
This table reflects cash holdings (standardized by total assets) for firms differentiated by
industry. Only firms with at least 250 firm-year observations per industry are reported
here. The column ‘Con’ represents concentration of firms by industry for the total
sample. Next, I compute the cash holdings for strong governance firms and poor
governance firms again segregated by industry. The last column reports the ratio of cash
holdings for strong over poor governance firms. The governance measure used here to is
the Gomper, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G-Index. Similar results were obtained when
Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell (2005) E-Index was used. The results are sorted in
increasing order of the ratio of cash holdings held by strong governance firms over poor
governance firms. The corresponding average Q values are reported here for the
respective industry.
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In Panel B of Table 6, I further examine this issue by sorting the industries by the
ratio of cash holdings of strong and poor governance and adding in average Q of the
industry. The results of the table are consistent with the idea as an industry’s Q increase
so does the cash holdings ratio. This table is sorted by the ratio, as tabulated in the last
column.
1.4.3

Multivariate Tests
Table 7 illustrates the results from a regression with cash holdings as the

dependent variable. The regression examines the effects of governance on cash holdings,
while controlling for several other factors. The base model is as follows:
Cash_Holdingsi t = a0 + a1Gi,t + a2KZi,t + a3Sizei,t + a4CashFlowi,t + a5Leveragei,t
a6Market-to-booki,t + a7NWCi,t +a8Capital Expendituresi,t + a9Aquisitionsi,t + Year
Dummies + Industry Dummies + ei,t
The results of the fixed effects regression confirm the main findings of the
previous univariate tests in a multivariate setting. The coefficient for G-index in column
(1) of Table 7 is negative and statistically significant, meaning firms with better
governance hold a significantly higher percentage of assets in cash. The coefficient for
KZ-index is also negative and significant. Since increases in KZ mean higher financial
constraint, the negative relation means firms with lower levels of constraint hold more
cash. This result lends support to the rational expectation that firms hold more cash when
they are able to (low financial constraints), and they hold less cash when sources of funds
are tight (high financial constraints). Size is also negative and significant as smaller firms
hold a higher percentage of cash per asset. Cash flow is positive and significant as better
firm performance leads to higher total cash holdings. This variable also helps to control
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for the documented difference in performance between strong and poor governance
(Harford, et al. 2008). Leverage is negative and significant, which suggests that the high
fixed payments associated with high leverage lowers cash holdings. Consistent with the
univariate findings, the coefficient for Q is positive and significant as firms with better
opportunities hold a higher percentage of cash. The positive relationship between capital
expenditures and cash holdings indicates that firms in greater need for capital additions
hold a greater percentage of cash. The acquisition variable shows a negative and
significant relationship with cash holdings, indicating that firms engaging in acquisition
activity hold a lower percentage of cash. This finding is in line with Harford (1999), who
shows that cash rich firms are more likely to actively pursue active acquisition strategy
and in the process lower their cash holdings. The R-squared of this regression is high at
0.8526.
Column (2) of table 7 adds net working capital to the regression. This variable is
negative and significant and is in agreement with prior work. Dittmar et al. (2003) show
similar results and comment that net working capital and cash holdings appear to be
substitutes. Column (3) of Table 7 uses a dummy variable for strong governance instead
of using the raw g-index number. This is done to see if we get the same result as was
conducted in Column (1) when we use a dummy variable instead of the continuous gindex variable since the results could be influenced by a few firms with really strong or
poor governance. The result from the dummy variable used to measure strong governance
is the same as when using the raw g-index in column (1) and supports the results from the
previous tables. The other variables in this regression do not change significantly.
Columns (4) and (5) run similar tests but use the e-index instead of the g-index used in
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the other columns. The results using e-index are the same as those found when using gindex. As e-index decrease or as managers become less entrenched they hold a higher
percentage of cash.
Table 7. Multivariate Tests: Impact of Governance on Cash Holdings
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA)
(1)
G-Index
-0.0046
(0.00)
Strong Governance Dummy

(2)
-0.0044
(0.00)

Poor Governance Dummy

(3)

(4)

0.0313
(0.00)
-0.0021
(0.22)

0.0303
(0.00)
-0.0007
(0.70)

E-index
KZ-Index
Size
Cashflow
Leverage
Q

-0.0005
(0.00)
-0.0046
(0.00)
0.1831
(0.00)
-0.0637
(0.00)
0.0211
(0.00)

-0.0006
(0.00)
-0.0066
(0.00)
0.1863
(0.00)
-0.0595
(0.00)
0.0208
(0.00)

0.1141
(0.00)
-0.1641
(0.00)

-0.0005
(0.00)
-0.0044
(0.00)
0.1733
(0.00)
-0.0972
(0.00)
0.0194
(0.00)
-0.0576
(0.00)
0.1207
(0.00)
-0.1546
(0.00)

0.1112
(0.00)
-0.1704
(0.00)

-0.0005
(0.00)
-0.0066
(0.00)
0.1746
(0.00)
-0.0994
(0.00)
0.0189
(0.00)
-0.0701
(0.01)
0.1156
(0.00)
-0.1586
(0.00)

Yes
17587
0.8526

Yes
17587
0.8525

Yes
17587
0.7656

Yes
17587
0.7418

NWC
CAPEX
ACQ

Constant
Number of Obs.
R-squared Overall

(5)

-0.0125
(0.00)
-0.0005
(0.00)
-0.0054
(0.00)
0.1826
(0.00)
-0.0607
(0.00)
0.0199
(0.00)

0.1341
(0.00)
-0.1614
(0.00)
Yes
17587
0.8486

This table shows the regression of the dependant variable: Cash Holdings (Cash / TA) on
governance measures G-index in model (1) and (2). Model (3) and (4) use strong and
poor governance dummy by G-Index and E-Index respectively. Size, Leverage, Cash
flow, Q, Net working capital, capital expenditures, Acquisitions, the financial constraint
measure KZ index are being used as control variables in this regression. The construction
of these variables is detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as industry dummy.
Finally the year dummies were also considered in order to control for fluctuations on
account of passage of time. Model (5) uses E-index in place of G-index. P-values are
shown in parentheses.
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Both measures of governance lead to the same result, with strong governance
positively related to cash holdings. These findings suggest that agency problems are not
the driving force behind the higher cash holdings in recent years. After finding this result,
the big question that arises is why do firms with better governance hold a higher
percentage of their assets in cash. We address this question next.
Table 8 examines the question of governance and cash holdings with a two-way
sort of governance and other key variables used in the regression. The results with size
and governance illustrate small firms with strong governance hold the highest cash as a
percentage of assets, while large poor governance firms hold the least cash. The next sort
examines governance with Q and finds the highest level of cash holdings for firms with
strong governance and high Q or high growth opportunities. This makes sense as firms
with greater opportunities may want to hold higher levels of cash to take better advantage
of future opportunities.
The next sort examines governance and the KZ-index. Firms with strong
governance and low financial constraint hold the highest percentage of cash, suggesting
that these firms may hold more cash when they are financially able to, perhaps building
up slack for weaker times. The difference between firms with strong and weak
governance is negligible when firms in both the groups are financially constrained. These
findings suggest that firms with strong governance build up cash when available, but poor
governance firms do not build up as much cash even when they are not financially
constrained. Finally, I observe higher cash holdings for firms that are not in distress as
compared to firms in distress. Panel B uses e-index as a measure for governance with a
similar result.
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Table 8A. Cash Holdings and Governance Using G Index – Double Sort
Panel A: G-Index is used to calculate good, average, and poor governance
Large Size
Medium Size
Small Size

Good
0.0944
0.1194
0.2079

Average
0.0761
0.1176
0.1789

Poor
0.0544
0.0734
0.1130

Difference (Good - Poor)
0.0400**
0.0460**
0.0949***

Low Q
Avg Q
High Q

Good
0.0900
0.1182
0.2353

Average
0.0796
0.0962
0.2056

Poor
0.0530
0.0573
0.1310

Difference
0.0369**
0.0610**
0.1043***

KZ1 (Con)
KZ2 (Avg)
KZ3 (Not Con)

Good
0.0604
0.1285
0.2696

Average
0.0520
0.0978
0.2250

Poor
0.0410
0.0617
0.1147

Difference
0.0195**
0.0669**
0.1549***

Good
Average
Poor
Difference
Distressed
0.1146
0.0953 0.0602
0.0544**
Not Distress
0.1629
0.1318 0.0770
0.0859**
Panel A of this table reflects the univariate test of the key variable – the cash holdings
against the governance measures G-Index broadly grouped as good, average and poor
governance firms respectively. G-Index is the Gompers et al (2003) score used as a proxy
for governance measure of firms in this paper. The next sets of variables are grouped by
size. Total assets adjusted for CPI index for 2004 dollars are sorted and the smallest
tercile grouped as small firms and so on. KZ index scores, computed in accordance with
Lamont et al (2001) methodology, are also grouped by terciles, the smallest of the three
labeled as financially unconstrained firms. Probability of distress is measured following
Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology. Distress dummy is
1 when Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy is greater than 0.5. Q variable is computed as
the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of firm and proxy growth
opportunities. Q values with less than 1 are firms with low growth opportunities, Q
values between 1 and 2 as firms with average growth opportunities and Q values greater
than 2 are firms with greatest growth opportunities. Cash holdings are computed as cash
and marketable securities standardized by total assets. The last column shows difference
of means t-test.
*** indicates significant at 1% confidence level
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Table 8B. Cash Holdings and Governance Using E Index – Double Sort
Panel B: E-Index is used to calculate good, average, and poor governance
Good Average
Poor
Difference
Large Size
0.0974 0.0732 0.0490
0.0485***
Medium Size
0.1299 0.1132 0.0718
0.0581***
Small Size
0.2134 0.1783 0.1261
0.0873***

Low Q
Avg Q
High Q

Good
0.0851
0.1128
0.2408

Average
0.0831
0.0962
0.1957

Poor
0.0587
0.0648
0.1375

Difference
0.0264**
0.0480**
0.1033***

KZ1 (Con)
KZ2 (Avg)
KZ3 (not Con)

Good
0.0605
0.1227
0.2548

Average
0.0539
0.0981
0.2195

Poor
0.0399
0.0669
0.1379

Difference
0.0207**
0.0558***
0.1168***

Good Average
Poor
Difference
Distressed
0.1143 0.0996 0.0572
0.0571***
Not Distressed
0.1615 0.1290 0.0840
0.0775***
Panel B of this table reflects the univariate test of the key variable – the cash holdings
against the governance measure E-Index broadly grouped as good, average and poor
governance firms respectively. E-Index is the Bebchuck et al (2005) score, being used as
a proxy for governance measure of firms in this paper. The next sets of variables are
grouped by size. Total assets adjusted for CPI index for 2004 dollars are sorted and the
smallest tercile grouped as small firms and so on. KZ index scores, computed in
accordance with Lamont et al (2001) methodology, are also grouped by terciles, the
smallest of the three labeled as financially unconstrained firms. Probability of distress is
measured following Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy methodology.
Distress dummy is 1 when Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy is greater than 0.5. Q
variable is computed as the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of firm and
proxy growth opportunities. Q values with less than 1 are firms with low growth
opportunities, Q values between 1 and 2 as firms with average growth opportunities and
Q values greater than 2 are firms with greatest growth opportunities. Cash holdings are
computed as cash and marketable securities standardized by total assets. The last column
shows difference of means t-test.
*** indicates significant at 1% confidence level

36

It appears that firms with strong governance hold higher levels of cash as growth
opportunities increase. My proposal is strong governance firms will increase holdings
when advised to do so. One of the times when firms could be benefited from higher cash
holdings is when they have strong growth opportunities. Table 9 takes a deeper look into
this notion. Column (1) of table 9 examines the sample of firms with high levels of Q as
measured with a Q above 2. Column (2) and column (3) examine the sample of firms
with average Q (Q values between 1 and 2) and low Q (Q values less than 1) respectively.
The examination of each sample illustrates the magnitude of g-index decreases when
moving from high Q to low Q. In column (3), which examines only low Q firms, the gindex is insignificant. That is, governance is not significantly related to cash holdings
when examining firms with limited growth opportunities.
This story is consistent with the idea of firms with strong governance holding
more cash when appropriate or when it is in shareholders’ best interest. Column (4)
examines the whole sample and uses a dummy for both strong governance and high Q. It
also includes an interaction variable of high Q and strong governance. All three variables
are positive and significant. Strong governance, high Q, and the combination of the two
all increase cash holdings. The strong governance dummy variable is significant but
lower in magnitude as compared to Table (7) where the interaction term is not used. This
would appear to be consistent with the idea of one viable reason for strong governance
firms to hold more cash. They hold higher level of cash when these firms have stronger
growth opportunities and do so more than other firms with weaker governance. This in
depth analysis of the role of growth opportunities to firm cash holdings adds to the results
shown in Harford et al. (2008) paper.
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Table 9. Multivariate Tests: Sample Differentiated by Growth Opportunities
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA)
Sample
High Q
(1)
G-Index
-0.0216
(0.00)
Strong Governance Dummy

Avg Q
(2)
-0.0067
(0.00)

Low Q
(3)
-0.0002
(0.46)

Poor Governance Dummy
KZ-Index
Size
Cashflow
Leverage
Q

-0.0044
(0.00)
-0.0194
(0.00)
0.2185
(0.00)
-0.1324
(0.00)
0.0170
(0.00)

-0.0001
(0.00)
-0.0102
(0.00)
0.1413
(0.00)
-0.1307
(0.00)
0.0731
(0.00)

-0.0011
(0.00)
-0.0237
(0.00)
0.1351
(0.00)
-0.1065
(0.00)
0.0457
(0.22)

High Q Dummy

-0.0811
(0.00)
0.1905
(0.00)
-0.5599
(0.00)

-0.1128
(0.00)
0.1401
(0.01)
-0.0986
(0.00)

-0.0735
(0.00)
0.3742
(0.00)
-0.0208
(0.10)

Yes
4558
0.7921

Yes
10266
0.7598

Yes
2763
0.2349

Yes
17587
0.8300

Strong Governance Dummy * Q

CAPEX
ACQ

Constant
Number of Obs.
R-squared Overall

0.0365
(0.00)
-0.0034
(0.05)
-0.0006
(0.00)
-0.0040
(0.00)
0.1714
(0.00)
-0.1270
(0.00)

0.0385
(0.00)
-0.0211
(0.00)
0.0008
(0.10)
-0.0734
(0.00)
0.1366
(0.00)
-0.1678
(0.00)

Low Q Dummy

NWC

Full Sample
(4)

This table shows the regression of the dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash/TA) on
governance measure G-index, constraint measure KZ index, and other control variables –
Size (log of total assets), cash flow, Q, Leverage, NWC, CAPEX and ACQ. 2-digit SIC
codes are used as industry dummy. Finally the year dummies were also considered in
order to control for fluctuations on account of passage of time. The sample of
independent variables is restricted in sample size by grouping firms in brackets of High
Q, Average Q and Low Q. The last column reflects the results of using full sample. High
Q, Low Q dummy variables and an interaction variable of strong governance dummy
with Q is included in this model.
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In this paper I agree with Harford et al. results that firms with better governance
and better growth opportunities hold higher levels of cash holdings, but I further extend
my study to show that only well-governed firms with better growth opportunities hold
significantly higher levels of cash holdings. Well governed firms with low growth
opportunities do not significantly differ in their cash holdings when compared to poorlygoverned firms with low growth opportunities.
Another reason for holding additional cash is financial slack. It may help firms to
hold additional cash as it may help them avoid financial constraints and even financial
distress. To test this notion I examine if firm governance is negatively related to financial
constraint status of firms. Table 10 examines this issue. Column (1) examines the sample
of firms considered financially unconstrained by the KZ-index measure. For firms
considered financially unconstrained, governance as measured by the g-index is negative
and significant. That is, financially unconstrained firms with better governance hold more
cash than unconstrained firms with poor governance. In contrast, as shown in column (2),
governance does not affect the level of cash holdings when firms are financially
constrained. This finding suggests that strong governance firms hold cash when available
(i.e., when financially unconstrained). Columns (3) and (4) examine firms with strong
governance and poor governance. Cash holdings for firms with strong governance are
significantly influenced by the KZ-index and level of Q, while firms with poor
governance are unaffected by the KZ-index and influenced by Q at a much smaller
margin. The results of this table are consistent with the idea of firms with strong
governance holding more cash with increasing growth opportunities (as measured by Q)
and decreasing financial constraint (as measured by the KZ-index). The other interesting
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insight in this table is that poorly governed firms choose to hold lower levels of cash
holdings and do not plan for contingencies of constraint or growth opportunities’
conditions.
Table 10. Multivariate Tests: Sample Differentiated by Financial Status and Governance
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA)
NonSample
Constrained
Constrained
(1)
(2)
G-Index
-0.0118
-0.0010
(0.00)
(0.19)
KZ-Index
Size
Cashflow
Leverage
Q
NWC
CAPEX
ACQ

-0.0104
(0.00)
0.1446
(0.00)
-0.0768
(0.00)
0.0115
(0.00)
-0.0445
(0.00)
0.2742
(0.00)
-0.2221
(0.00)

-0.0001
(0.15)
0.5811
(0.00)
-0.0016
(0.00)
0.0059
(0.00)
0.0407
(0.00)
0.0402
(0.00)
-0.0473
(0.00)

Good Gov
(3)

Poor Gov
(4)

-0.0078
(0.00)
-0.0061
(0.00)
0.1793
(0.00)
-0.1078
(0.00)
0.0183
(0.00)
-0.0992
(0.00)
0.0942
(0.00)
-0.0769
(0.00)

0.0000
(0.84)
-0.0047
(0.00)
0.4641
(0.00)
-0.1252
(0.00)
0.0015
(0.00)
0.0117
(0.00)
-0.0644
(0.00)
-0.0018
(0.28)

Constant
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Number of Obs.
5509
6153
5451
3457
R-squared Overall
0.8450
0.9481
0.7416
0.6738
This table shows the regression of the dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash/TA) on
governance measure G-index, constraint measure KZ index, and other control variables –
Size (log of total assets), cash flow, Q, Leverage, NWC, CAPEX and ACQ. The
construction of these variables is detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as
industry dummy. Finally the year dummies were also considered in order to control for
fluctuations on account of passage of time. The sample of independent variables is
restricted in sample size by grouping firms in brackets of Constraint, Non-Constraint,
Good governance and Poor governance firms using KZ Governance dummy respectively.
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Harford at al. (2008) paper do not study the role of financial constraints when
analyzing the firm cash holdings in presence of firm governance. The results that the
higher cash holdings for financially unconstrained firms as against financially constraint
firms is true only when firms are well governed, is significant addition to existing
literature. The other variables under column (4) of this table show that poorly governed
firms lower the level of cash holdings when faced with choices of additional capital
expenditures, acquisitions and in paying off some of the debt from its balance sheet.
Table 11 tests the robustness of the results from the early tables, looking to see if
the results are influenced by differing time periods of the sample or by industry affects. I
examine time affects and industry affects as the results from tables 3 and 5 indicate
variation in time and in industries. Column (1) of table 11 examines the time period from
1990—1997. This regression illustrates governance was a significant during the time
period but to a lesser degree than shown in table 7. Column (2) of table 11 examines the
period from 1998-2005. This regression demonstrates a similar relation with governance
but the magnitude is over double in size. The results from the time period analysis
indicate governance has become more significant in terms of determining cash holding of
firms. In column (3) of table 11, I conduct regressions using fixed effects for industry (3).
I find the use of fixed effects for industry does not significantly change the results
reported from table 7. The results of this table indicate time period and industry does not
change the relation between governance and cash holdings.
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Table 11. Robustness Tests – Time and Industry Variation
Dep. Var: CH

1990-1997

1998-2005

Fixed Industry

Macro_Adj

Ind_Adj_ch

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.0015

-0.0032

-0.0075

-0.0019

-0.0039

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

-0.0004

-0.0006

-0.0005

-0.0001

-0.0001

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.079)

-0.0053

-0.0031

-0.0035

-0.0013

-0.0106

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

0.2884

0.1631

0.1658

0.2693

0.1031

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

Leverage

-0.0269

-0.0187

-0.1139

-0.0431

-0.0058

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

Q

0.0136

0.0164

0.0204

0.0057

0.0059

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

NWC

-0.0188

-0.0233

-0.0335

-0.0598

-0.0018

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

CAPEX

0.1078

0.0896

0.2504

-0.0439

0.1044

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

-0.0367

-0.0930

-0.1447

-0.0795

-0.0017

(0.04)

(0.00)

(0.00)

0.000

(0.000)

G-Index
KZ-Index
Size
Cashflow

ACQ
GDP_Gr_Dummy

-0.0057
0.000

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Constant

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Obs.

8309

9278

17587

17587

17587

0.9633

0.7582

0.8448

0.4523

0.3031

R-squared Overall

This table shows the regression of the dependant variable Cash Holdings on governance
measure G-index, constraint measure KZ index, and other control variables – Size, Cash
Flow, Q, Leverage, NWC, CAPEX and ACQ. The construction of these variables is
detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as industry dummy in models (1), (2) and
(3). The year dummies were considered in order to control for fluctuations on account of
passage of time in models (1) and (2). Model (1) considers firm-years 1990-1997 and
model (2) reflects results when 1998-2005 firm-years were considered. Model (3)
controls for fixed industry effects. Model (4) controls for time variation by using GDP
growth factor. Model (5) reflects regression results for firm-years by controlling for
industry with mean adjusted values for cash holdings in place of 2-digit SIC dummy.
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In model (4) I replace the year dummies with a variable that reflects the
macroeconomic condition over the sample period. I consider the GDP growth for every
year in the sample period and construct a dummy variable where in the value 1 captures
above average growth in GDP and 0 value implies below average growth. Over the
sample period the average GDP comes out to 2.96%. Based on the construct of the
dummy variable explained above I observe the GDP growth higher than the average for
years 1992, 1994, 1996-2000, 2004, and 2005 and vice-versa for the rest of the years. All
the results of model (4) regression are consistent with earlier findings. The GDP growth
dummy variable is negative and significant meaning that firms decrease cash holdings in
years when US economy does better than average. In model (5) the primary regression is
run with industry adjusted CH as the dependent variable. The results of this regression
agree with the model (3) results. Next, I address the issue if any, with using Q as my
proxy for growth opportunities. Since Tobin’s q has been used as a proxy in studies of the
relationship between insider ownership and market-based performance, I construct
another proxy variable for growth opportunities in place of Q and test for robustness of
my primary tests. I use the ratio of R&D to total assets as my proxy for growth
opportunities. The results are provided in Table 12. All the results of my earlier
regression stand even with the new proxy variable for growth opportunities.
The final robustness test for this study is carried out in two separate regressions
with two different dependent variables but by including lags of key independent
variables. The lag independent variables tested here over the two separate regressions
include the governance measure Gt-1, the cash holding variable CHt-1, the interaction
between the lag cash holding variable and the good governance lag variable(for Panel A
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shown in Table 13) and the lag of constraint measure KZt-1 as shown in Panel B of Table
13. In the first regression the dependent variable considered is the financial constraint
measure, the KZ index.
Table 12. Robustness Tests: Using R&D / Total Assets as a Proxy Measure for the
Growth opportunities in place of Q
Dependant Variable: Cash Holding (Cash / TA)
(1)
G-Index
-0.0002
(0.05)
Strong Governance Dummy

(2)
-0.0004
(0.02)

Poor Governance Dummy

(3)

(4)

-0.0067
(0.00)
-0.0014
(0.66)

-0.0017
(0.433)
-0.0118
(0.00)

E-index
KZ-Index
Size
Cash flow
Leverage
R&D/TA

-0.0007
(0.00)
-0.0059
(0.00)
0.1553
(0.00)
-0.0999
(0.00)
0.6333
(0.00)

-0.0006
(0.00)
-0.0055
(0.00)
0.1542
(0.00)
-0.0991
(0.00)
0.6469
(0.00)

0.1281
(0.00)
0.0461
(0.00)

-0.0004
(0.00)
-0.0038
(0.00)
0.1337
(0.00)
-0.2367
(0.00)
0. 5066
(0.00)
-0.1317
(0.00)
0.1348
(0.00)
0.0021
(0.00)

0.1328
(0.00)
0.0448
(0.00)

-0.0004
(0.00)
-0.0043
(0.00)
0.1341
(0.00)
-0.2391
(0.00)
0.5253
(0.00)
-0.1346
(0.03)
0.1255
(0.00)
0.0006
(0.95)

Yes
8551
0.8771

Yes
8551
0.8680

Yes
8551
0.8778

Yes
8551
0.8703

NWC
CAPEX
ACQ

Constant
Number of Obs.
R-squared Overall

(5)

-0.0163
(0.00)
-0.0007
(0.00)
-0.0071
(0.00)
0.1584
(0.00)
-0.0947
(0.00)
0.5631
(0.00)

0.1298
(0.00)
0.0590
(0.00)
Yes
8551
0.8630

This table shows the regression of the dependant variable: Cash Holdings (Cash / TA) on
governance measures G-index in model (1) and (2). Model (3) and (4) use strong and
poor governance dummy by G-Index. Size, Leverage, Cash flow, Net working capital,
capital expenditures, Acquisitions, the financial constraint measure KZ index are being
used as control variables in this regression. R&D/Total Assets is used as a proxy measure
for growth opportunities in place of Q – used in all the earlier tests. The construction of
these variables is detailed in Table 1. 2-digit SIC codes are used as industry dummy.
Finally the year dummies were also considered in order to control for fluctuations on
account of passage of time. Model (5) uses E-index in place of G-index. P-values are
shown in parentheses.
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Table 13. Robustness Tests: Testing with Lag Variables
Dependant
Variable
Gt-1

CHt-1
CHt-1*Good_Gt-1

Panel A

Panel B

:KZ

: Cash
holdings

0.880
(0.000)
-22.662
(0.000)
-7.190
(0.006)

KZt-1
Size
Leverage
Cash flow
Q
NWC
CAPEX
ACQ
Constant
Number of Obs.
R-Squared Overall

-0.0012
(0.001)
0.4465
(0.000)

-2.333
(0.000)
6.451
(0.002)
-16.906
(0.000)
-0.047
(0.855)
-3.769
(0.000)
7.077
(0.248)
-1.417
(0.705)
yes
14689

-0.00004
(0.003)
-0.0012
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.000)
0.1134
(0.010)
0.0353
(0.000)
-0.054
(0.000)
0.0961
(0.000)
-0.1486
(0.000)
yes
14074

0.080

0.8149

Panel A of this table shows the regression of the dependent variable KZ index on 1period lag variables: G-index, Cash holdings, and KZ index and the interaction variable
of KZ index and cash holdings in lag form. Size, Leverage, Q, Cash flow, Net working
capital, capital expenditures, and Acquisitions, are being used as control variables in this
regression. P-values are shown in parentheses.
Panel B of this table shows the regression of the dependant variable: Cash Holdings
(Cash / TA) on 1-period lag variables: cash holdings, governance measure G-index, and
the financial constraint measure KZ index. Size, Leverage, Q, Cash flow, Net working
capital, capital expenditures, and Acquisitions, are being used as control variables in this
regression. This regression closely emulates Harford, et al. (2008) test. P-values are
shown in parentheses.
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The results in Panel A of table 13 indicate that with increase in G index (higher
number implying poor governance), the KZ index increases (higher KZ index number
implies constrained firm). In other words, well governed firms in the current time period
tend to be less financially constrained in the next period. The lag of cash holding
variable has a large and significant negative coefficient. This result implies that increase
in cash holdings in the current time period significantly decreases the likelihood of firm
being financially constrained in the next time period. This result is in agreement with the
earlier results shown, and that financially unconstrained firms tend to have higher levels
of cash holdings.
The next test variable is the interaction of the lags of cash holdings and good
governance variables. The coefficient is negative and significant at 6% level. This
significant negative coefficient for the interaction term suggests that well-governed firms
with higher cash holdings are less likely to get into financial trouble in the subsequent
period. These results in combination with Table 10 results adds to the significant
understanding of the role of financial constraints and governance plays in defining the
nature of firm cash holdings. Next, as expected – larger firms, firms with increased cash
flow and firms with increased net working capital expenditures (negative and significant
coefficient) are less financially constrained while firms with more leverage (positive and
significant coefficient) are more financially constrained.
In the panel B of Table 13 the regression shown is similar to the Harford et al
(2008) regression. The dependent variable here is the cash holdings and the key test
variables including itself (cash holdings) are in lag form. The results of this paper are
consistent with the results shown in the Harford, et al paper. A negative and significant
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coefficient variable for the lag G Index implies that poorly governed firms in the prior
time period tend to hold lower level of cash holdings in the following time period. Firms
that hold higher level of cash holdings and those that are less financially constrained in
the lag period and firms with positive growth opportunities tend to hold higher level of
cash holdings in the following period. These results agree with the prior findings of this
paper showing that well governed firms, less financially constrained firms, and firms that
have better growth opportunities tend to hold higher level of cash holdings.
1. 5

Conclusions
In the presence of capital market imperfections deriving from asymmetric

information between managers and capital providers, liquidity can take on a strategic
role. The first interesting result that I find in this paper is firms with strong governance
tend to hold higher level of cash holdings as compared to poorly governed firms. It
appears strong governance firms are able to mitigate agency issues associated with
holding cash and lower the marginal costs of holding cash, thus increasing the value of
holding cash. The reason for strong governance firms holding more cash is consistent
with two benefits of holding cash. One reason for firms with strong governance to hold
more cash is when the firm has strong growth opportunities. Holding additional cash
provides the firms better opportunities to take advantage of investment opportunities as
they arise.
Firms with strong governance are also selective in increasing their cash holdings
as firms with limited growth opportunities do not hold higher levels of cash. Another
reason for firms with strong governance to hold more cash is to provide financial slack to
avoid distress during downturns. Firms with strong governance hold more cash when
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financial constraints are low and cash is available. In contrast, poorly governed firms are
indifferent to the financial condition of the firm with respect to its level of cash holdings
and hold lower levels of cash in either scenario.
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Essay 2
Do Management Decisions Matter When Firms Are In Distress?
2.1

Introduction
One aspect of economic theory argues that competitive markets in transition to

long-run equilibrium eliminate inefficient firms through the process of bankruptcy and
liquidation. James (1995), Hotchkiss (1995), and Kahl (2002) argue that reorganization of
firms after bankruptcy filings is pointless, as these firms are simply delaying an inevitable
corporate death. Furthermore, White (1989) argues that managers voluntarily choose to
keep the firm going instead of liquidating as a self-interested preservation of their own
jobs. This evidence seems to paint a dim picture of a firm’s ability to eventually work
itself out of bankruptcy. In the twelve month period ended December 31, 2007, there
were 28,322 businesses that filed for bankruptcy, according to the U.S. federal court
data8. As alarming as those numbers are, they are small in comparison to the number of
firms that are in distress each year.
Previous researchers have attributed manager ineffectiveness, poor timing, and
lack of contingency planning (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; Schendel,
Patton and Riggs, 1976) as the leading indicators in the decline of corporate performance
leading to financial distress. Several authors have pointed to different areas of the
8

Of these 28,322 businesses, 78 were publicly trading firms. The five largest bankruptcy filings from this
list are real estate / mortgage-related financial companies. Further, the largest filing of 2007 (New Century
Financial – Pre-petition assets: $26 billion) made it into the 10 largest bankruptcies of all time.
Source: BankruptcyData.com, a division of New Generation Research, Inc.,
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business that may increase firm performance while under distress9. Financial distress is
typically a precursor to bankruptcy as many financially distressed firms appear on future
years’ list of bankrupt firms. Given the grim picture of bankruptcy, is financial distress
any different? Are managerial decisions during distress effective in improving the firm's
prospects? Anecdotal evidence shows that many well-known, financially strong firms
have at one time been in severe financial distress10. Thus, even with the aforementioned
dark view of a firm’s ability to re-establish itself, many managers manage to pull their
firms out of financial distress each year.
In this paper, I look to examine if a firm’s success in leaving distress is explained
by firm characteristics and manager decisions. I primarily focus on two questions: how
do some firms find their way out of distress while others do not, and what impact do
managers’ decisions have on distress? To answers these questions, I examine the
characteristics and manager financing and investing decisions that lead firms out of
distress and back to financial stability.
To define manager investing and financing decisions affecting firms’ distress
status, I start with the bankruptcy model as defined by Beaver (1966). “The firm is
viewed as a reservoir of liquid assets, which is supplied by inflows and drained by out
flows. The reservoir serves as a cushion or buffer against variations in the flows. The
solvency of the firm can be defined in terms of the probability that the reservoir will be
exhausted at which point the firm will be unable to pay its obligations as they mature (i.e.
9

Some of the many are (Bibeault 1982), operational restructuring (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997), asset
restructuring on the lines of management buyouts (MBOs) (Kaplan, 1989), asset divestment (Kang and
Shivdasani, 1997), asset investment (Bhagat, Moyen and Suh, 2005), acquisitions (Grinyer, Mayes and
McKiernan, 1988), and financial restructuring (Slatter, 1984; John, Lang, and Netter 1992)
10
Xerox Corporation and Eastman Kodak are couple of notable examples. A more detailed discussion is
given later.
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failure)”. Both the current ‘type’ and ‘timing’ of inflows and outflows are largely
influenced by the management’s prior time-period decisions. This being the case, then the
current decisions of managers will influence the nature of future cash flows. I analyze
managers’ decisions ex ante to study what type of decisions help distressed firms to come
out of financial distress.
The importance of manager actions under distress is not a brand new idea.
Support for diverse management actions when in distress is found in Ofek (1993). Ofek
explores the various responses of a firm in distress regarding both its operational and
financial conditions, and analyzes why some distressed firms choose certain responses
over others. Thus, they look at different management choices but not the success of the
choice. Bhagat, Moyen, and Suh (2005) analyze both healthy and distressed firms. They
focus on the investment policy for these two groups, and find a significant number of
financially distressed firms have negative cash flow sensitivity. These findings suggest
that managers of firms in distress invest more than they did in the prior year. However,
their study does not examine how these actions influence whether or not distressed firms
are able to get out of financial distress. Kane and Richardson (2002) show that firms that
are more likely to get out of distress opt to reduce the size of their property, plant, and
equipment. I extend this study further by analyzing other changes managers make to
increase the probability of getting out of the state of financial distress.
To accomplish this goal, I first compile a sample of distressed firms. From the
sample of distressed firms, I differentiate the financial status of a firm into two different
state variables (State 1: Not distressed; and State 2: Distressed) in the future. Following
Bhagat, Moyen and Suh (2005), I use Ohlson’s (1980) probabilistic prediction of
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bankruptcy measure to distinguish between the above two mentioned states. Through this
analysis, I can identify if firm characteristics and management decisions play a role in
firms’ exiting financial distress, or if, similar to the results for firms reorganizing after
bankruptcy, the managers have no real impact on distress status.
The results show firm characteristics are important in determining the future
financial state of the firm. Size, leverage, and income at the time a firm enters financial
distress are significant in determining if firms are able to exit distress. More specifically,
larger firms with less leverage and higher income at the time they enter distress have a
better chance of exiting distress within a three year period. The results on managers’
decisions show managers who increase their investment in product refinement by
significantly increasing the research and development expenditures help firms to get out
of distress. I further explore the role of increase in research and development investment
in helping firms successfully turnaround. I find that the increase in R&D helps firms with
average and low growth opportunities. For firms with high growth opportunities simple
increase in R&D investment does not help firms to exit distress. I infer from this result
that distress for high growth firms has less to do with its own product as compared to
other factors discussed in literature that cause distress. Firms with average and low
growth opportunities are usually found in well established industries and they have a
higher leverage to communicate the changes to the product thus positively impacting
future cash flows and hence exit distress. Working capital investment is not significantly
related to the future financial state of the firm. In support of Kane and Richardson (2002),
the findings also show that firms lowering their level of capital expenditures are more
likely to exit distress. This evidence is consistent with the argument that cost cutting and
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trimming firm operations to provide additional funds for research and development can
contribute significantly towards a successful turnaround. The results also show the
inability of changes in financing choices to move a firm out of distress. Firms selling
common or preferred stock to raise money, as also shown in Bhagat et al. (2005), does
not increase the likelihood of firms’ exiting distress.
So, why does it matter which firms make it out of distress? In addition to the
intuitive answer, the importance of leaving financial distress can be explained in more
than one way. As far as the indirect costs of bankruptcy are concerned, the costs keep
increasing as a firm sinks deeper into distress and results in the loss of reputation and
potential drop in sales due to poor financial performance. I focus on shareholders’
primary concern, stock returns. As expected, the returns for the sample of firms
remaining in distress are significantly lower than those successfully exiting distress
during the three year period. Firms leaving distress have three-year holding period returns
around 37 percent points higher than their counterparts unable to make it out of distress.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II highlights issues of
the macroeconomic conditions from the recent past in regards to firms experiencing
performance decline and their attempts at turnaround. Section III details the relevant
literature leading up to this study. Section IV presents a discussion of the Ohlson’s
measure used for distinguishing the distressed versus non distressed samples. Section V
offers information on data collection and further identifies the control and the test
variables used in the study. Section VI presents a discussion of results and Section VII
concludes.
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2.2

Background: Firms Exiting Financial Distress
Many firms find their way out distress by making key corporate decisions.

Schefenacker, which makes mirrors for carmakers such as BMW and Mercedes, when
faced with serious financial distress in late 2006, emerged from a tortuous restructuring,
moved their headquarters, downsized its debt by 47%, and its founder gave up threequarters of his shares to creditors. Downsizing of workforce (General Motors);
restructuring of capital structure (Meridian); asset sale (Ford); and change in top
management (Citigroup, Merrill Lynch) are a few recent examples of how managements
of different firms have reacted to performance declines. The related literature has so far
focused on three forms of exit strategies for distressed firms – resolution through
bankruptcy filing, voluntary liquidation, and merger and acquisition. These exit strategies
invariably result in losses for the stockholders of the firm. White (1983) emphasizes how
equity holders always favor continuance since their interest is eliminated if liquidation is
chosen. Hence, a sizable number of distressed firms choose alternative strategies to
combat distress and continue to keep the owner’s control over the firm. This paper
analyzes the strategies employed by firm management that have preserved and helped
grow shareholder’s wealth after the financial distress phase.
2.3

Literature Review
The supporting literature for this paper can be categorized into three distinct

themes. The first is the financial distress literature which has focused largely on
explaining11 and measuring the costs of distress12. The next significant research area tied

11

Direct Costs: From the capital structure perspective significant costs on account of financial distress for
stockholders in the form of legal and administrative costs of restructuring the firm’s debt.
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to this paper addresses topics such as turnaround and recovery in the face of declining
performance. Turnaround is closely associated with management strategy, as researchers
explored various mechanisms employed by managers attempting turnarounds.
2.3.1

Financial Distress
Altman (1983) introduces corporate distress by including with it the legal process

of corporate bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation and describes it as “a sobering
economic reality reflecting the uniqueness of the American way of corporate death.” In
contrast, Wruck (1990) states categorically that “financial distress – is not synonymous
with corporate death.” She finds that firms in financial distress face a variety of situations
having very different effects on their values and claimholders. This diversity in
conjunction with conflicts of interest among claimholders, leads to an information
problem that makes valuing a distressed firm difficult. Interestingly, Wruck (1990)
identifies the ‘upsides’ associated with financial distress. She states that financial distress
is often accompanied by comprehensive organizational changes in management,
governance and structure. This organizational restructuring can create value by
improving the use of resources. Financial distress frees resources to move to highervalued uses by forcing managers and directors to reduce capacity and to rethink operating
policies and strategy decisions. This kind of organizational change is unlikely to occur in
an all-equity firm, because without leverage, poor performance does not lead to financial
distress. It is financial distress that gives creditors a legal right to demand restructuring.
Indirect costs: The opportunity loss suffered when corporate resources are diverted to debt restructuring
process from more productive uses (reviewed by Myers (1984) and Masulis (1988))
Managerial financial distress costs: Gilson (1989) shows that 52% of all sampled firms experience a seniorlevel management change during the period of financial distress
12
Warner (1977) measures the direct costs as result of bankruptcy; Ang et al (1982) attempt to measure the
administrative costs as a result of Bankruptcy.
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Kaplan (1989) analyzes financially distressed firms that subsequently complete
management buyouts over the period from 1985 through 1989. They find a higher
incidence of default on their debt ex-post the buyout decision. Denis and Denis (1995)
analyze the causes and resolutions of financially distressed firms by examining a sample
of 29 leveraged recapitalizations completed between 1985 and 1988. Interestingly they do
not find a higher rate of asset sales among the distressed firms and, when asset sales do
occur, the market participants treat this news as a negative signal.
2.3.2

Management Strategy
Bracker (1980) reviews the historical development of the strategic management

concept and discusses the many definitions of strategy offered by various researchers13,
as related to the business world. He states that “The major importance of strategic
management is that it gives organizations a framework for developing abilities for
anticipating and coping with change.” Schendel and Patton (1978) work out a
simultaneous equation model of corporate strategy. They refer the strategic concept to
multiple levels: the corporate level, the business level, and the functional area level.
Hofer (1980) discusses two types of corporate turnaround strategies: strategic and
operating. His discussion leads to a conclusion that strategic turnarounds most often
involve a significant shift in the nature of the business. Managers adopting operating
turnaround strategy refocus their energies on the core business by choosing to emphasize

13

Few examples: (i) Strategy is a series of actions by a firm that are decided on according to the particular
situation. – Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; (ii) Strategies are directional action decisions which are
required competitively to achieve the company’s purpose. – Cannon, 1968; (iii) Strategies are forwardlooking plans that anticipate change and initiate action to take advantage of opportunities that are integrated
into the concepts or mission of the company – Newman & Logan, 1971; (iv) Strategy is concerned with
long-range objectives and ways of pursuing them that affect the system as a whole. – Ackoff, 1974; (v)
Strategy is a meditating force between the organization and its environment: consistent patterns in streams
of organizational decisions to deal with the environment – Mintzberg – 1979.
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one of the four following areas: increasing revenues, decreasing costs, decreasing assets,
or a combination effort.
2.3.3

Turnarounds
Schendel et al. (1975) studied 54 firms each with four consecutive years of

earnings decline and then subsequently four consecutive years of earnings improvement.
They use information from business periodicals regarding these firms to study the causes
of decline and actions taken for successful turnaround. They subjectively rate the causes
for decline and actions taken for turnaround and classify each as either strategic or
operating in nature. Hofer (1980) applied similar logic to his research. His analysis of 12
poorly performing firms showed firms that became distressed on account of poor
strategic decisions successively had “strategic” turnarounds. Those firms’ whose cause of
distress resulted from poor operating decisions made “operating” turnarounds. Bibeault
(1982) surveyed 81 chief executives who had faced turnaround situations. His discussions
with the professionals attempting turnarounds add invaluable insights into issues such as
leadership aspects as well as organizational and human issues. In his view, the primary
objectives for the financially distressed firm are survival and achievement of a positive
cash flow.
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) argued against the dichotomy of classifying
turnaround actions as “strategic” and “operational” since the distinction between
classifications have blurred. The sample for their study is drawn from PIMS database14.
The target sample was the available data over four years on all mature industrial-product

14

Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS) is a large scale statistical study of environmental, strategic,
and performance variables of individual business units.
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businesses15 in the PIMS database. A total of 260 businesses met their required criterion
for low performance including those that subsequently made performance improvements.
Their cluster analysis indicated three primary successful turnaround actions: asset/cost
surgery, selective product/market pruning, and a piecemeal strategy. Robbins and Pearce
(1992) address the turnaround process in terms of retrenchment and recovery. In the
retrenchment phase, they hypothesize firms seek to stabilize declining performance
through reductions in costs and fixed assets. In the recovery phase, systematic
investments are made to stimulate financial improvement. Their research design
constrained their sample to firms that faced reasonably similar operating and competitive
conditions. Their sample consisted of firms belonging to a single specific industry
(Textile). They concluded that successful turnarounds were often a result of efficiency
moves rather than of product-market changes or of market share increases.
Hoshi et al. (1990) find the financially distressed group of firms invest more and
sell more than non-group firms in the years following the onset of financial distress;
Asquith et al. (1994) analyze firms that issued junk bonds in the 1970s and 80s and
subsequently experienced financial trouble. Consistent with Ofek (1993), their study
shows that distressed firms undertake restructuring primarily by selling assets. Sharpe
(1994) shows a statistically and economically significant relationship between a firm’s
financial leverage and the cyclicality of its labor force. He shows that firms that
experience relatively high opportunity costs of capital during cyclical downturns are
prone to reduce employment so as to conserve their working capital at such times. John et

15

A mature business is defined by PIMS as one in an industry whose real growth is less than 10 percent
annually, in which most potential buyers understand the product, and whose set of competitors is well
known.
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al. (1992) study a sample of large firms (firms with assets exceeding $1 billion) with a
performance decline in the sample period (at least one year of negative earnings (19801987), followed by at least 3 years of positive earnings). They find strong evidence of
changes in operations and investment to these performance shocks. These changes they
find are result of voluntary actions by the firm managers and not in reaction to a threat of
change in corporate control. Their study suggested that the firms retrenched16 quickly,
and on average concentrated their focus. In the year following negative earnings, average
employment fell by about 5% and the average number of business segments declined.
The arguments presented by the above two papers and others suggest that firms with
declining performance often choose to sell assets as they go through the restructuring
process.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) discuss the nature of asset illiquidity especially in the
context of distress firms. They argue that when firms have trouble meeting debt payments
and sell assets, the highest valuation potential buyers of these assets are likely to be other
firms in the same industry. But with the possibility of a contagion effect, these firms
themselves are likely to have trouble meeting their debt payments. The other probable
group of buyers of these assets, industry outsiders, would face agency costs of hiring
specialists to run these assets and may fear overpaying for lack of proper knowledge of
the assets characteristics. Hence when industry buyers cannot buy the assets and industry
outsiders face significant costs of acquiring and managing the assets, assets in liquidation
fetch prices below value in best use, which is the value when managed by specialist.

16

Defined as reduction in firm assets and/or costs.
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In addition to asset sales and layoffs, capital expenditure reductions also play a
role in restructuring of a distressed firm. In examining financially distressed companies
that previously issued high yield junk bonds, Asquith et al. (1994) show that eighty-three
percent of firms reduce capital expenditures from the year before the onset of distress to
the year after. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine the investment behavior of
financially distressed firms that remain in good economic health. They find that firms in
financial distress but in good economic health decrease their capital investment
expenditures, sell assets at depressed prices, but do not undertake riskier investment
projects.
Kane and Richardson (2002)’s sample of financial distress firms include firms
that have high likelihood of impending failure but have not yet filed for bankruptcy
protection. They consider such firms to no longer be ‘going concerns’. Their focus is
primarily on two potentially mitigating actions – growth or contraction of plant
investment and the likelihood that either action will lead to emergence from financial
distress, thereby reducing the risk of corporate failure. They conclude in favor of
contraction stating that disinvestment increases the likelihood of the firm getting out of
distress. Cleary et al. (2004) develop a model of a U-shaped relation between investment
and internal funds. As is standard, the firm invests less when it faces a decrease in
internal funds. For low levels of internal funds, however, the firm must invest more to
generate enough revenues to meet its contractual obligations. Investments therefore form
a U-shape over all internal fund levels. Moyen (2004) also graphs a U-shaped relation
between investment and cash flows for unconstrained firms. In bad conditions, firms
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invest more to generate more revenues next period, thereby decreasing the probability of
defaulting and paying default costs.
Bhagat et al. (2005) document negative cash flow sensitivity for distressed firms
with operating losses and a positive sensitivity for all other firms. They also show that the
negative cash flow sensitivity is generated by distressed firms with operating losses that
invest more than the previous years. These firms invest more when their cash flows are
decreasing. They claim that this additional investment is made on account of funds raised
by equity claimants and infer this as evidence of a gamble for resurrection. They also
provide evidence consistent with an asset substitution problem only for the subset of
financially distressed firms with operating losses that invest more than the previous year.
2.4

The Sample and Variables

2.4.1

The Sample Selection Process
The initial sample consists of all companies drawn from COMPUSTAT during

the period 1989 to 2001 that had financial data available for six contiguous fiscal years.
Three consecutive years of data is required to compute the measure of distress. The
following three consecutive year restriction is needed to test the financial condition three
years hence. The returns data is extracted from the CRSP database. Using Ohlson’s
methodology, probabilistic predictions of bankruptcy are computed for each firm year in
the total sample. Following Bhagat, et al. (2005) firms with 50% or greater probability
are counted as financially distressed firms. The total sample size of all distressed firms is
18,434 firm-years. The rest of the sample for which the probability of distress is less than
50% is treated as non-distressed firms for the respective years for which the probabilities
are computed. The total sample size of all non distressed firms is 30,948 firm-years.
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Schendel et al., (1975) provide a concrete definition of upturn as four consecutive
years of increasing profits. Among Hofer’s (1980) successful turnarounds, the average
elapsed time from trough to peak was three years. Bibeault(1982) noted that the time
required for a turnaround is a function of the size of the organization: “Altogether, we are
talking about anywhere between one and three years, with a $20 million company taking
one year and a company the size of Memorex taking three years”. For this study, I am
considering turnaround as a firm in distress in year t and out of distress t+3 years hence.
Thus, for each year the firms are in distress, the measure of distress (O-score) is
recomputed for all such firms three years hence. These two steps lead to the formation of
my sample of firms that ‘remain in distress’ and firms that had ‘successful turnaround’.
This database now reflects each firm’s financial position as healthy or in distress after the
three year measurement period, identifying if the distress firm made a recovery three
years after being classified as distressed. A total of 3,050 firm-years or 16.5% of the total
distressed sample successfully completed a turnaround three years after entering distress.
The control and test variables were also obtained from COMPUSTAT.
2.4.2

Control Variables
The empirical literature cited earlier with regard to turnaround strategies suggests

that suitability and effectiveness of turnaround strategies are dependent on certain
intrinsic factors. These factors are relevant to a firm’s financial condition and impact the
direction and intensity of decline or recovery. They are generally not altered significantly
in magnitude by manager’s actions in a short duration. Size is computed as log of total
assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total liabilities divided by total assets (Item
#181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total assets (item #13/#6); growth
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opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed as market value of assets
divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 + #74)} / #6) and cash
holdings (#1).
2.4.3

Test Variables
The objective of this paper is to observe and identify those distinguishing

managerial actions that contribute significantly towards a successful turnaround of a
distressed firm. Based on the assumption that significant changes in managerial decisions
will be reflected in the financial statements, I compute the changes observed in certain
specific variables and analyze their impact on the firm’s health three years hence. A time
period of three years is allowed to pass by to study the impact of those decisions – a
justifiably conservative approach for the manager’s actions to work through the firm’s
operations. These specific factors have been addressed in earlier papers but either have
yielded contrary results or have not been explained in regards to recovery from distress.
For firms in distress, changes are observed and recorded for these following factors: (i)
Change in acquisitions (item #129) ((Grinyer, Mayes and McKiernan, 1988), (ii) Change
in capital expenditure (item #128) (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997, Bhagat, Moyen and Suh,
2005), (iii) change in working capital (item #4-#5) (Kang and Shivdasani, 1997), (iv)
change in equity (item #216) (Slatter, 1984; John, Lang, and Netter 1992), (v) change in
research and development (item # 46) (Guerard et al., 1987)17 and (vi) change in net
income (item #172) (Schendel et al., 1975). Table 14 discusses the variables to be used in
this paper.

17

Guerard et al, (1987) model R&D expenditures as a function of previous years’ R&D expenses and hence
use the raw changes in R&D expenditures when analyzing the corporate financial policy.
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Table 14. Variable Construction
S.No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Variable
Notation
Size
Cash
Tobin’s Q
Leverage
Operating
Income.
O-Score

Variable Description
Natural logarithm of total assets
Cash Holdings
Market value of assets / Book Value of assets
Total Debt / Total Assets
Operating Income/Total Assets
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA –
1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA –
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG .521*CHIN
Ln(TA)
TLTA
WCTA
CLCA
NITA
FUTL
INTWO

R&Dt+1 – R&Dt

Ln(#6 t)
#181 t /#6 t
(#4 t - #5 t) / #6 t
#5 t /#4 t
#172 t /#6 t
#110 t /#181 t
1 if #172t & #172t-1 <
0; 0 otherwise.
1 if #181 t > #6 t; 0
otherwise.
(NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| |NIt-1|)
#46t+1 - #46t

Capital Expenditurest+1 – Capital Expenditurest

#128t+1 - #128t

Aquisitionst+1 – Acquisitionst

#129t+1 - #129t

Working Capitalt+1 – Working Capitalt
Shareholders’ Equityt+1 – Shareholders Equityt

(#5-#4)t+1–(#5-#4)t
#216t+1 - #216t

Net Incomet+1 – Net Incomet
Annual returns

#172t+1 - #172t
CRSP Database

OENEG
CHIN
7.
8.
9.
10
11.
12.
13.

Chg in
R&D
Chg in
CAPX
Chg in
Acq.
Chg in WC
Chg in
Equity
Chg in NI
Returns

Compustat
Notation
Ln(#6t)
#1 t
{(#199 t * #25 t) + #6 t
– (#60 t + #74 t)} / #6 t
#181 t / #6 t
#13 t /#6 t

This table details the construction of the distress variable (based on the probabilistic
predictions of bankruptcy as derived from Ohlson’s score), control variables, and test
variables.
2.5

Measures of Financial Distress
The goal is to use a method that reflects decline in performance leading to varying

degree of financial distress. Prior research has considered negative net income as a sign
of financial trouble with most of them having considered more than one year of negative
net income to classify a firm as financially distressed. Some other methods applied to
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capture the financial distress status of firms are as follows: Fazzari et al. (1988) consider
firms with negative real sales growth as financially distressed firms. Wruck (1990)
defines financial distress as a situation where cash flow is insufficient to cover current
obligations. Hoshi et al. (1990) assume a firm is approaching distress when the ratio of
operating income to interest expense (interest coverage) falls below one. Asquith,
Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) define financial distress in the most fundamental way,
i.e., liquidation value of a firm’s asset is less than the face value of the firm’s liabilities.
Ofek (1993) constructs a distressed firm sample by including firms that experience a year
of average or above average performance (base year) followed by a year of very poor
performance (distress year), defined as annual stock returns in the bottom decile of the
market. Opler and Titman (1994) identify industries that have experienced economic
distress and differentiate firms in those industries based on their leverage ratios. A 3-digit
SIC industry is defined as being economically distressed when its median sales growth is
negative and when it experiences median stock returns below -30%. Ciccone (2001) uses
proxy for financial distress with a bottom line focus. He considers a firm in financial
distress if it has losses, (i.e. earningst < 0), and earnings decline (i.e. actual annual
earningst < actual annual earningst-1).
In addition to the above measures a more comprehensive way to classify firms on
the continuum is to compute the probability of a firm becoming bankrupt. The two
methodologies most commonly applied in the literature are accounting-based measures of
distress risk – (i) Z-score (Altman, 1968) and (ii) O-score (Ohlson, 1980). Altman (1968)
investigates a set of financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction context using a multiple
discriminant statistical methodology. Ohlson (1980) uses maximum likelihood estimation
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of the so-called conditional logit model to predict corporate failure as evidenced by the
event of bankruptcy. They identify four basic factors as being statistically significant in
affecting the probability of failure within one year – (i) size; (ii) measures of financial
structure; (iii) measures of performance; and (iv) measures of current liquidity.
In this paper, I use Ohlson’s probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure very
closely imitating Bhagat, Moyen and Suh’s (2005) use of the same measure to identify
firms in performance decline. This measure is based on Ohlson’s predicted bankruptcy
probabilities p, where
P = 1 / (1 + e-Yit)
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln (TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA –
2.37*NITA – 1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN
Where TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities
ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of the current period with
the previous period over the absolute value of the difference. (NIt – NIt-1)/ (|NIt| - |NIt-1|).
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Table 15A. Non-Distressed vs. Distressed Firms - Summary Statistics
Non-Distressed Firms
Obs.
Mean
30,948
5.4176
30,948
0.3911

Distressed Firms
Obs.
Mean
18,434
4.3947
18,434
0.6976

Variable
Difference
Total Assets
1.0229***
Leverage
-0.3065***
Operating Income /
TA
30,948
0.1239
18,434
-0.0429
0.1668***
Q
30,948
2.1071
18,434
2.3176
-0.2104
Cash
30,948
186.0336 18,434
51.9170
134.12***
O-Score
30,948
-1.9044
18,434
1.3788
-3.2832***
Ohlson’s probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure is used to distinguish between
healthy or distressed status. The measure predicts bankruptcy probabilities p, where
P = 1 / (1 + e-Yit)
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA –
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN
Wherein TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities
ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of current period with
previous period over the absolute value of the difference. (NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| - |NIt-1|).
Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total
liabilities divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total
assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and
computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6
– (#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1).
Following Bhagat, et al. (2005), this measure is obtained from a variant of
Ohlson’s bankruptcy probability model. Because the FUTL variable greatly restricts the
sample size, pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities, ˜p, are calculated by ignoring the effect of
FUTL in predicting bankruptcy probabilities:
˜p = 1/ (1 + e-Yit)
Firms with declining performance and facing financial distress include firm-year
observations with pseudo-bankruptcy probabilities greater than or equal to 50%. Panel A
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of Table 15 compares the distressed sample used in this paper to a sample of nondistressed firm. This table justifies the choice of the distress measure (O-score) used in
this paper in determining and labeling firms’ financial condition as distressed or not
distressed. I look at some important firm variables and see if the O-score appears to
predict firms with distressed characteristics. By comparing the sample of firms not
considered in distress with the firms that are considered in distress, we see the distressed
sample appears to be accurately predicted by O-score. I further examine control variable
to identify differences between a typical firm in distress as compared to a firm not in
distress. Total asset size is a key variable in determining the distress level of firms, as
shown by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). The size of the firm is a proxy for both the
flexibility and internal slack available to the declining firm. The firms in distress are
expected to be of smaller size and this is observed using a measure of size, which is the
natural log of total assets. Leverage is also a key determinant in distress level (Kaplan
and Stein, 1993). It is expected that firms with higher leverage, on average, to be in
distress more often. Consistent with this prediction the firms in distress have doubled the
amount of leverage as compared to non-distressed firms in the sample.
Operating income is also an important determinant in figuring out firm distress
level (Ciccone, 2001). Firms with lower and especially negative operating income on
average will find themselves in distress. Consistent with the idea, firms identified as
distressed have a negative operating income on average, while the non-distressed firms in
the sample have positive operating income. A firm’s Q, as a proxy for investment
opportunities, does not appear to affect the firm’s distress level (Opler and Titman, 1993).
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Table 15B. Non-Distressed vs. Distressed Firms – Industry Concentration

Distressed Firms
SIC % of
Code sample

Non-Distressed
Firms
SIC
% of
Code sample

Business Services

73

10.89%

73

9.15%

Chemicals and Allied Products

28

7.27%

28

9.38%

Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment
And Components, Except Computer
Equipment
Industrial And Commercial Machinery And
Computer Equipment
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling
Instruments; Photographic, Medical And
Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks

49

6.85%

49

3.64%

36

6.72%

36

9.92%

35

6.34%

35

7.75%

38

5.92%

38

8.04%

Oil And Gas Extraction

13

4.94%

13

3.53%

Communications

48

4.36%

48

2.43%

Wholesale Trade-durable Goods

50

2.80%

50

2.68%

Eating And Drinking Places*

58

2.59%

-

-

Food And Kindred Products*
20
3.01%
The industry concentration for the top ten industries of distressed and non-distressed
firms, respectively, are measured and reported here. A total of 18,434 firm-year sample
size of distress firms and 30,948 firm-year non-distressed firm sample size is considered
for the sample period of 1989-2004. Industry classification and description information is
gathered from U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health administration
website manual. http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html
* Only top ten industries for distressed and non-distressed firms shown here.
Specifically, distressed firms have higher investment opportunities as defined by
Q but not by a significant amount. Distressed firms hold a fraction of the cash as firms
not in distress. John (1993) argues that firms hold more cash as avoidance to financial
distress. Panel B of Table 15 examines the industry concentration of firms not in distress
versus the industry concentration of firms that are in distress. The panel demonstrates that
some industries have a higher probability of having firms in distress. The industry SIC
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code with the highest concentration for the distressed sample is SIC code 73 (Business
Services). This SIC code makes up almost 11 percent of the total distressed sample, while
making up approximately 9 percent of the total non-distressed sample. In contrast, SIC
code 36 (Electronics and other Electrical Equipment Components) makes up 6.72 percent
of the distressed sample but almost 10 percent of the non-distressed sample. These results
demonstrate the variation among different industries and the different levels of risk
among industries (Hou and Robinson, 2006). Certain industries have a higher probability
of firms entering distress than others. This highlights the need for industry controls.
2.6

Empirical Results

2.6.1

Sample Statistics and Univariate Tests
Table 16 examines the sample statistics for the whole sample of firms in distress

for the given year, the firms that made it out of distress in a three year period and the
sample of firms that did not make it out of distress in three years. The sample of firms
that made it out of distress represents about 15% of the entire sample of firms in distress,
while the remainder are firms that did not exit distress in the three year period. I compare
the difference between the variables for the two types of firms to examine if these
variables appear to estimate the successful exit from distress.
The results indicate firms making it out of distress in the three year period have
significant differences on average than firms remaining in distress. Firms getting out of
distress in a three year time period are larger in size as measured by total assets, have less
leverage, and have higher cash holdings.
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Table 16. Sample Statistics
Variable
Observations
Size
Leverage
Oper. Income / TA
Q
Cash
Chg in R&D
Chg in CAPX
Chg in Acq.
Chg in WC
Chg in Equity
Chg in NI

Full Sample
18,434
4.3947
0.6976
-0.0429
2.3176
51.9170
0.8920
0.5504
-3.0196
8.7819
-1.3049
18.6210

Out of Distress
3,055
4.5577
0.6204
-0.0152
2.1014
77.6547
3.4126
-5.3226
-2.8534
12.0342
0.0682
39.4163

Still in Distress
15,379
4.3624
0.7129
-0.0484
2.3604
46.8130
0.2509
2.0408
-3.0618
7.9548
-1.6542
13.3320

Difference
-12,324
0.1953***
-0.0924***
0.0332**
-0.2590
30.841***
3.1617**
-7.3634***
0.2085
4.0795***
1.7223
26.084***

Ohlson’s probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy measure is used to distinguish between
healthy or distressed firm status. The measure predicts bankruptcy probabilities p, where
P = 1 / (1 + e-Yit)
Yit = -1.32 - .407*(ln(TA)) + 6.03*TLTA – 1.43*WCTA + .757*CLCA – 2.37*NITA –
1.83*FUTL + .285*INTWO – 1.72OENEG - .521*CHIN
Wherein TA is total assets (COMPUSTAT #s in parentheses) (#6); TLTA is total
liabilities to total assets (#181/#6); WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets
[(#4 - #5) / #6]; CLCA is the current liabilities to current assets ratio (#5/#4); NITA is net
income to total assets ratio (#172/#6) and FUTL is fund from operations to total liabilities
ratio (#110/#181). INTWO = 1 if net income (#172) is negative in previous two years or
zero otherwise; ONEEG = 1 if total liabilities (#181) is greater than total assets (#6), 0
otherwise and CHIN is the ratio of the difference in net income of current period with
previous period over the absolute value of the difference. (NIt – NIt-1)/(|NIt| - |NIt-1|).
Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total liabilities
divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total assets
(item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed
as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 +
#74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1).
The change variables are all computed as a first difference year (t+1) – (t). The
year t is the year in which firm is identified as being in distress. The change variables are
computed for Change in acquisitions (item #129); Change in capital expenditure (item
#128); change in working capital (item #4-#5); change in equity (item #216); change in
research and development (item # 46); and change in net income (item #172)
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The next set of variables focus on changes made in the first year after a firm
enters distress. The average change in R&D is significantly higher for firms getting
themselves out of distress during the three year period. Thus, this finding suggests that
distressed firms that increase their investment in R&D have a greater incidence of
turnaround. Changes in other types of investments do not share this positive relation with
successfully exiting distress. For example, changes in capital expenditures (CAPEX) are
negative, as firms leaving the distress group have lower capital expenditures on average.
Acquisitions do not appear to affect firms’ ability to get out of distress, as change in
acquisition level is not significantly different for the two samples. Working capital
measures the firm’s net position in liquid assets. Change in working capital is much
higher for firms getting out of distress (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). Selling equity does
not appear to be different among the two groups, as they do not have a significant
difference in changes in equity. The change in yearly net income is much greater for
firms getting out of distress.
Table 17 provides a correlation matrix for all variables to be used in the
regressions. This table examines the correlation between the independent variables. I find
that the correlation coefficient between most of the variables is fairly low. One
coefficient that does provide some concern is the relation of leverage and operating
income standardized by assets. This variable has a correlation coefficient of 0.4225. This
high correlation may cause issues in the regressions, so I run the main regression with
and without both variables at the same time. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test were
also run to analyze further if any multicollinearity existed among independent variables.
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Table 17. Correlation Matrix

Size
Leverage
Income/TA
Q
Chg in R&D
Chg in CAPX
Chg in Acq.
Chg in WC
Chg in Equity
Chg in NI

Size
1
0.0015
(0.8343)
0.2095
(0.0000)
-0.0954
(0.0000)
0.0269
(0.0008)
0.0100
(0.2151)
-0.0491
(0.0000)
0.0348
(0.0000)
-0.0151
(0.0608)
0.0997
(0.0000)

Leverage

Income/TA

Q

Chg in
R&D

Chg in CAPX

Chg in
Acq.

Chg in
WC

Chg in
Equity

Chg in
NI

1
-0.4225
(0.0000)
0.1056
(0.0000)
0.0031
(0.7001)
0.0013
(0.8769)
-0.0024
(0.7632)
0.0047
(0.5593)
-0.0074
(0.3573)
0.0133
(0.0989)

1
-0.1657
(0.0000
0.0077
(0.3386)
0.0042
(0.6047)
-0.0007
(0.9319)
0.0047
(0.5563)
0.0031
(0.6994)
0.0006
(0.9417)

1
0.0006
(0.9440
0.0005
(0.9470
0.0032
(0.6931
0.0009
(0.9081
-0.0017
(0.8341
-0.0024
(0.7696)

1
0.2959
(0.0000)
0.0154
(0.0560)
0.1017
(0.0000)
-0.0379
(0.0000)
0.1137
(0.0000)

1
0.0156
(0.0538)
-0.1982
(0.0000)
0.0537
(0.0000)
-0.1750
(0.0000)

1
-0.0589
(0.0000)
0.1801
(0.0000)
0.0175
(0.0000)

1
-0.0589
(.0139)
0.2041
(0.0356)

1
-0.0620
(0.0000)

1

This table provides data on the correlations between certain variable measures. The dataset is comprised of 30,948 firm year
observations covering the period 1989 through 2004. Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total
liabilities divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities
for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 –
(#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). The change variables are all computed as a first difference year (t+1) – (t). The year t is the
year in which firm is identified as being in distress. The change variables are computed for Change in acquisitions (item #129) capital
expenditure (item #128); working capital (item #4-#5); equity (item #216); research and development (item # 46); and net income
(item #172)
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The largest VIF measure18 was observed for the operating income variable (1.47)
and the over-all mean VIF was 1.17.
2.6.2

Multivariate Tests
Table 18 shows a probit model measuring whether the firm has remained in

distress, equaling zero, or if the firm has exited distress, equaling one. I use this probit
model to measure the likelihood of the independent variables to explain which firms are
more likely to exit distress. I find that many different ex ante variables measuring the
condition of the firm and changes the firm makes over their first year of distress are
significant in predicting the success of firms exiting distress. In the first column, I
measure the condition of the firm with several controls and examine changes in assets
and changes in financing. The regression coefficient for size, as measured by the natural
log of total assets, is positive and statistically significant. Larger firms are more likely to
get out of distress as compared to smaller firms. Leverage is negative and statistically
significant in the regression with a coefficient of -0.6167. Firms with higher amounts of
leverage are much less likely to come out of distress. High fixed payments make it
extremely hard for firms to overcome distress. The coefficient for income over assets is
negative and statistically significant and the coefficient for Q is insignificant in the
regression.
The next set of variables measure changes that occur in the first year of distress to
see if these changes increase or decrease the probability of the firm exiting distress. The
change variables proxy the managers’ ‘turnaround’ decisions in reaction to the financial
distress. The first three variables measure if the firm’s use of resources in the first year of
18

Variance inflation factor (VIF) measures the impact of collinearity among the independent variables’ in a
regression model on the precision of estimation. Typically a VIF value greater than 10 is of concern.
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distress impacts the distress status of the firm. Consistent with the univariate evidence,
change in R&D is positive and significant. Firms that increase their R&D spending
increase the likelihood of getting out of distress. Support for this result can be traced back
to the arguments presented by Hofer (1980). Hofer categorizes turnaround strategies into
two broad types: ‘operating’ and ‘strategic’. ‘Operating’ turnaround strategies place
emphasis on increasing revenues, decreasing costs, decreasing assets or a combination of
these. ‘Strategic’ turnarounds involve either changing strategy for competing in the same
line of business or calls for entering a new business. Hofer states that employing
turnaround strategies to ‘save’ the existing business involves emphasis on functional area
by increasing investments in marketing, production, and/or engineering. The observed
increase in R&D spending by firms leading to successful turnaround can be attributed to
‘strategic’ turnaround technique employed by the management. The change in CAPEX
coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that an increase in spending on capital
expenditures decreases the likelihood of exiting distress. This result is consistent with the
main results of Kane and Richardson (2002). The coefficient for change in acquisitions is
insignificant, as the level of acquisitions by firms under distress does not impact distress
status of the firm.
The next two variables measure if financing activities of the firm matter to the
distress status of the firm. The coefficient of the change in working capital variable is
insignificant. The coefficient for change in the amount of common or preferred stock is
also insignificant. These variables display the irrelevance of a few of the financing
activities of firms.
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Table 18. Multivariate Tests: Probit Analysis

Total Assets
Leverage
Income / TA
Q
Chg in R&D
Chg in CAPX
Chg in Acq.
Chg in WC
Chg in Equity
Chg in NI
Year Dummies
Industry Dummies
Constant
Number of Obs.
Pseudo R-squared

(1)

(2)

0.0968
(0.00)
-0.6167
(0.00)
-0.0937
(0.02)
-0.0025
(0.51)
0.0003
(0.05)
-0.0002
(0.01)
0.0000
(0.97)
0.0000
(0.89)
0.0000
(0.98)
0.0001
(0.03)
Yes
Yes
-0.4607
(0.00)
14649
0.055

0.0920
(0.00)
-0.6172
(0.00)

0.003
(0.93)
0.0003
(0.05)
-0.0002
(0.01)
0.0000
(0.99)
0.0000
(0.87)
0.0000
(0.97)
0.0001
(0.02)
Yes
Yes
-0.4437
(0.00)
14649
0.054

The probit model measures whether the firm has remained in distress, equaling zero, or if
the firm has exited distress, equaling one. A total of 18,434 distressed firm-year sample
size is considered for the sample period of 1989-2004. Of these, 18,434 distressed firmyear sample size 3,040 firm-years exit financial distress condition over three year time
period. Size is computed as log of total assets (Item #6); Leverage is computed as total
liabilities divided by total assets (Item #181/#6); Operating Income standardized by total
assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and
computed as market value of assets divided by book value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6
– (#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). The change variables are all computed as a first
difference year (t+1) – (t). The year t is the year in which firm is identified as being in
distress. The change variables are computed for Change in acquisitions (item #129);
Change in capital expenditure (item #128); change in working capital (item #4-#5);
change in equity (item #216); change in research and development (item # 46); and
change in net income (item #172).
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Change in net income looks to capture if year one performance has an impact on
the firm distress status. This variable is positive and statistically significant as a good first
year in terms of better income will increase the likelihood of firms getting out of distress.
Both year and industry dummies were used in this regression.
Given a potential issue with multicollinearity I drop operating income to total
assets in column (2) of the regression to ensure that the earlier results are accurate.
Dropping this variable does not change any of the major results in column (1). After
illustrating the predictive ability of distress I then focus my attention on why that is
important.
The previous result showing increased investment in R&D is associated with
greater likelihood of turnaround seems plausible for higher growth firms for which
investments in technology can add value to the firm. It is of interest to investigate
whether the R&D finding is driven by high growth firms, or whether increased
investment in R&D assists in turnaround for non high growth firms as well. Thus, to
further understand the role of increased R&D expenditures in aiding distressed firms'
recovery , the probit model was run after dividing the sample into three distinct groups.
Using the Q values, firms were differentiated into high, average and low growth firms.
Firms with Q values greater than 2 were categorized as high growth firms. Firms with Q
value between 1 and 2 were categorized as average growth firms and finally firms with Q
value less than 1 were place in low growth category. 3,739 firm-years (25%), 7,749 firmyears (51%), and 3695 firm-years (24%) respectively was the each sub-group sample
size. The results of this probit regression are shown in Table 19. The findings are similar
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to that of the total sample regression of table 18. For all three groups, I observe that
probability of turnover increases with size and decreases with increase in leverage.
Table 19. Multivariate Tests: Sample Differentiated by Growth Opportunities
Total Assets
Leverage
Income / TA
Q
Chg in R&D
Chg in CAPX
Chg in Acq.
Chg in WC
Chg in Equity
Chg in NI
Year Dummies
Industry Dummies
Constant
Number of Obs.
Pseudo R-squared

Hi_Growth
0.0523
(0.001)
‐0.2013
(0.000)
0.0345
(0.008)
0.0028
(0.493)
0.00001
(0.294)
‐0.0011
(0.065)
0.00007
(0.948)
0.00004
(0.807)
‐0.00008
(0.281)
0.00022
(0.012)
Yes
Yes
‐0.688
(0.003)
3739
0.055

Avg_Growth
0.1288
(0.000)
‐1.2018
(0.000)
0.1640
(0.069)
0.0697
(0.299)
0.00025
(0.077)
‐0.0001
(0.005)
0.00002
(0.766)
0.00002
(0.756)
‐0.00009
(0.366)
0.00003
(0.057)
Yes
Yes
‐0.4437
(0.017)
7749
0.0770

Lo_Growth
0.1344
(0.000)
‐1.4735
(0.000)
0.1258
(0.100)
0.0773
(0.683)
0.00020
(0.039)
-0.0007
(0.061)
0.00008
(0.850)
0.00002
(0.761)
-0.00002
(0.472)
0.00003
(0.030)
Yes
Yes
-0.3740
(0.096)
3695
0.0734

The probit model measures whether the firm has remained in distress, equaling zero, or if
the firm has exited distress, equaling one. The sample size is 18,434 distressed firm-year
for the period of 1989-2004. Of these 3,040 firm-years exit financial distress condition
over three year time period. The sample here is separated into three groups by their
growth ranking. Firm-years with Q greater than 2 are grouped under “Hi-Growth”,
between 1 and 2 Q value firms are considered here as average growth and firms with Q
less than 1 are the Low Growth firms. Size Ln(Item #6); Leverage (Item #181/#6);
Operating Income standardized by total assets (item #13/#6); Growth opportunities for
the firm proxied by Tobin’s Q – and computed as market value of assets divided by book
value of assets ({(#199 * #25) + #6 – (#60 + #74)} / #6), Cash holdings (#1). The change
variables are all computed as a first difference year (t+1) – (t). The year t is the year in
which firm is identified as being in distress. The change variables are computed for
Change in acquisitions (item #129); Change in capital expenditure (item #128); change in
working capital (item #4-#5); change in equity (item #216); change in research and
development (item # 46); and change in net income (item #172).
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Increase in operating income increases the probability of successful turnover and
hence I observe positive and significant coefficient for all three sub-groups. The
important test variable, the change in R&D expenditures, shows a positive coefficient for
all three groups but is significant only for average and low growth firms at 8% and 4%
level, respectively. These findings suggest that firms with low to average growth
opportunities who increase their investments in R&D may be able to recover from
distress by focusing on product innovations or by improving the efficiency of their
operations by investments in technology (e.g., through automating aspects of the
production process). . The benefit of increasing R&D for high growth firms is not as
distinct, perhaps because the degree of R&D spending in more rapidly growing firms is
already relatively high.
While it is expected that firms that are able to exit distress will perform better
than firms that remain in a distress state, it is still of interest to measure the value of
exiting distress from a shareholder wealth perspective. Are the returns for firms out of
distress significantly higher than those for firms that linger in a distress state, or is the
difference in performance only marginal? Table 20 (Panel A) measures the three year
return for the group of firms able to get out of distress and the firms still in distress for
each individual year. The results of this table demonstrate the importance of exiting
distress. For the entire sample, firms that can make it out of distress perform significantly
better in terms of three-year returns as compared to the firms unable to emerge from
distress. The difference in three-year returns between the out of distress versus the sample
remaining in distress is around 37 percentage points. I also examine the three-year return
for each year individually. I find the same result holds over each individual year over the
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whole sample period. I do notice a variation of the return difference over time but each
year is significantly greater for sample of firms that are able to make it out of distress.
Each year is significant at the 1% level with the exception of 1996, which is significant at
the 10% level.
Table 20A. Comparison of 3-Year Returns for the two Samples and Over Time
Time Period
Out of Distress
Still in Distress
Difference
Full Sample
1.0787
0.7049
0.3738***
1989
1.1809
0.4948
0.6861***
1990
1.5521
1.1512
0.4009***
1991
0.9219
0.6272
0.2947***
1992
0.8561
0.5541
0.302***
1993
0.9388
0.4425
0.4963***
1994
1.0273
0.6923
0.3358***
1995
1.0470
0.3851
0.6619***
1996
0.7796
0.6381
0.1415*
1997
1.0935
0.4496
0.6439***
1998
1.1967
0.7292
0.4675***
1999
0.8825
0.1967
0.6858***
2000
1.4593
1.0235
0.4358***
2001
1.2478
0.9472
0.3006***
The returns are acquired from CRSP database. A total of 18,434 distressed firm-year
sample size is considered for the sample period of 1989-2004. Of the 18,434 firm-year
3,040 firm-years exited out of distress. The returns shown here are three-year returns.
The ‘out of distress’ column tabulates three-year returns for the total sample for firms
that were in distress at certain point in time and three years hence had a successful
turnaround. The ‘still in distress’ column lists three-year returns of firms that were in
distress at certain point in time and continued to be in financial distress post three years.
Further panel B of Table 20 uses abnormal returns computed over three year
period using market adjusted returns. It is observed that the interpretation of panel A
continues to hold even when abnormal returns are used in place of three-year buy and
hold returns. The results for the three-year returns provide two findings for the paper.
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Table 20B. Comparison of 3-year Abnormal Returns for the two Samples and Over Time
Time Period
Out of Distress
Still in Distress
Difference
Full Sample
0.4124
0.1703
0.2421***
1989
0.6809
0.1403
0.5406***
1990
0.3060
0.1989
0.1070
1991
0.2640
0.1572
0.1069
1992
0.1301
0.0096
0.1205*
1993
0.3801
0.0800
0.3001***
1994
0.3286
0.0793
0.2492***
1995
0.5599
0.0754
0.4845***
1996
0.1341
0.1313
0.0028
1997
0.2967
0.1860
0.1106*
1998
0.4052
0.0480
0.3573***
1999
0.7537
0.2189
0.5348***
2000
0.6187
0.3995
0.2193*
2001
0.7764
0.5764
0.2000**
The returns are acquired from CRSP database. A total of 18,434 distressed firm-year
sample size is considered for the sample period of 1989-2004. Of the 18,434 firm-year
observations 3,040 firm-years exited out of distress. The returns shown here are threeyear abnormal returns. The ‘out of distress’ column tabulates three-year abnormal returns
for the total sample for firms that were in distress at certain point in time and three years
hence had a successful turnaround. The ‘still in distress’ column lists three-year
abnormal returns of firms that were in distress at certain point in time and continued to be
in financial distress three years hence.
First, the market seems to agree with the O-score identification that these firms
are indeed doing better than firms still in distress. So, three-year returns and the
corresponding abnormal returns are much higher for firms exiting distress. Also, in table
20 I define predictable ex-ante firm characteristics that can help us explain whether or not
a firm increases their likelihood of getting out of distress. These predictable
characteristics could help us identify firms, which are more likely to exit distress and
have strong three-year returns. This could possibly increase the risk-return tradeoff for
investors looking to find investment on riskier firms that are currently in distress.
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2.7

Conclusions
In this paper, I find firm turnaround is predictable with ex ante variables. Both

firm characteristics and investment decision affect a firm’s likelihood to exit financial
distress. Size, leverage, and income level at the time of distress all impact firm distress
level. The primary result of the paper suggests that firms can take timely actions in
response to distress. Investments in product development through research and
development spending increase the probability of a firm making a successful turnaround.
Further, I find that this increased R&D investment is even more important for firms with
average and low growth opportunities. Other results, such as the relationship between
capital expenditure reductions and recovery from distress, are consistent with previous
studies. The finding suggest that firms may be able to increase the likelihood of exiting
distress by reducing capital expenditures and making investments in research and
development which can lead to increased production efficiency or product innovations.
Financial decisions do not have a significant effect on successful firm turnaround,
suggesting that financing strategies during distress are not important in determining the
success of a turnaround.
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